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Keith Jobson*

The Parole Board:
What Liability to Victims?

I. Introduction
What is the legal position of a victim of crime who is assaulted and
severely injured by a person on parole release? The victim, of
course, has a right to sue his or her assailant personally in tort for
damages, but does the victim have a right to sue the prison and
parole agencies for negligence in releasing or in supervising the
offender? The victim's right to recovery against the authorities
requires an examination of the right to damages in an action in
negligence under the common law, as well as consideration of a
possible remedy under the Charter of Rights.' Both a private law
remedy in negligence and a possible public law remedy under the
Charter require a preliminary examination of the purposes of the
Parole Act 2 in conferring upon prison and parole officials powers of
release and supervision of prisoners, and an understanding of the
nature of parole decision-making and the procedures involved. A
knowledge of these purposes, powers, and procedures will have a
bearing on whether official actions are (a) ultra vires the powers of
the board and, therefore, actionable; (b) intra vires but "discretionary" and, therefore, immune from liability even though negligent;
(c) intra vires and "operationally" negligent, so as to support an
action in damages; 3 or (d) a breach of the requirements of
*Professor of Law, University of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia.
1. The Canada Act, 1982, Stats. U.K. 1982, c. 11, Schedule B, The Constitution
Act, 1982.
2. Parole Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-2.
3. For an analysis of various proceedings to review acts of officials: Hogg, Peter
W., Liability of the Crown (Sydney: Law Book Co., 197 I); Goldenberg, Sidney
L., "Tort Actions Against the Crown in Ontario", in Special Lectures, Law
Society of Upper Canada, 1973, 341-412; Molot, Henry L., "Tort Remedies
Against Administrative Tribunals for Economic Loss", in Special Lectures, Law
Society of Upper Canada, 1973, 413-447; Molot, Henry L., Administrative
Discretion and Current Judicial Activism (1979) 11 Ottawa L. Rev. 337-370;
Craig, P.P., Negligence in the Exercise of a Statutory Power (1978) 94 Law Q.
Rev. 428-456; Gould, B.C., Damages as a Remedy in Administrative Law
(1972-73) 5 N.Z. Univ. L. Rev. 105-122; Harlow, C., Fault Liability in French
and English Public Law (1976) 39 Mod. L. Rev. 516-541; Bridge, M.G.,
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"fundamental justice" under section 7 of the Charter, so as to
support a section 24 Charter remedy.
The victim's claim to a remedy against prison and parole officials
is complicated by the fact that the Parole Act is obsolescent, posing
a set of statutory objectives which, with the passage of time, are
seen to be impossible to achieve. The statute contemplates parole
release in the interest of the rehabilitation of offenders, but
contemporary knowledge shows that prison policies and programs
cannot, at present, and are unlikely in the foreseeable future to
achieve such a goal. In addition, the Parole Act states that the Parole
Board must not release a person in the face of an "undue risk" to the
public safety, but experts are agreed that risk cannot be assessed
with reliability. 4 If the agency cannot possibly meet its statutory
objectives, are its actions ultra vires the statute in attempting the
impossible, or contrary to the Charter, in that the state has exposed
citizens to grave risks in the name of an illusory objective, there
being no rational means of achieving that objective? The victim's
claim to justice in the face of an obsolescent statute is also
complicated by the fact that common law courts have historically
been reluctant to grant a remedy in negligence against public
5
officials whose actions have occasioned loss or injury.
This paper takes an overview of the victim's position when faced
with an injury inflicted by a person on parole release. The nature of
the parole release decision, the attitude of the courts when called
upon for a private law remedy in negligence, and the possibility of a
public law remedy under the Canadian Charter of Rights are
reviewed, so as to identify the main legal problems and to suggest
that the courts must be invited to take a more active approach to
problems of official accountability, thereby developing a uniquely
Governmental Liability, the Tort of Negligence and the House of Lords Decision in
Anns. v. Merton London Borough Council (1978) 24 McGill L.J. 277-302.

4. Monahan, J., "The Prediction of Violent Criminal Behaviour: A Methodological Critique and Perspectus", in A. Blumstein et al, eds., Deterrence and
Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates

(Washington D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1978) 244-269; Monahan, J.,
Predicting Violent Behaviour (Beverley Hills: Sage Publications, 1981); Webster,
C.D., Menzies, R.J., and Jackson, M.A., ClinicalAssessment Before Trial, Legal
Issues and Mental Disorder (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982); Nuffield, J., Parole

Decision-making in Canada (Ottawa: Ministry of the Solicitor General, 1982) pp.
12-17.
5. Toews v. MacKenzie (1980) 109 D.L.R. (3d) 473 (B.C.C.A.).
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Canadian approach in order that victims of the prison system receive
justice under the law.
II. The Purposes of Parole
The Parole Act came into force in 1959,6 following a Royal
Commission report which recommended that the then existing law
permitting the release of selected offenders on a Ticket of Leave be
abolished and the new system of parole be introduced. 7 The act
confers a discretion on the Parole Board or its agents to release
prisoners under supervision where the board considers that (a) the
prisoner has derived maximum benefit from imprisonment, (b) the
reform and rehabilitation of the prisoner will be aided by a grant of
parole, and (c) the release will not constitute an undue risk to
society. 8 While the first two criteria speak to the rehabilitation of
the prisoner, the third speaks to a second objective, namely, the
protection of society through risk avoidance. Although the statute
does not specify the relative priority of rehabilitation and protection,
it is reasonable to think that Parliament intended that, in cases of
conflict, public protection shall come first .
It is worth noting that the act does not justify parole release as an
economy measure - for example, as a means of reducing the costs
of operating prisons; nor does the act justify parole as a
humanitarian gesture, granted in order to relieve the person of the
miseries of imprisonment. Rather, the statutory criteria justify
parole release only on the two grounds of the rehabilitation of the
offender and the protection of the public. The victim's claim is that
the assumptions of rehabilitation and prediction of risk are
out-of-date, given present knowledge, and are demonstrably false.
This obsolescence imparts an arbitrary aura to the actions of
officials striving vainly to meet statutory objectives.
During the 1950s, rehabilitation was widely accepted as a
legitimate goal of prison policy; it was assumed that official action
and therapeutic programs could change prisoners so as to reduce
recidivism. 9 In the past ten years, significant research shows that
6. Parole Act, S.C., 1958, c. 38.
7. Report of a Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Principlesand Procedures
Followed in the Remission Service of the Departmentof Justice of Canada (Ottawa:

Queen's Printer, 1956) at 51.
8. Parole Act, supra, fn. 2, s. 10.

9. The assumptions are well-illustrated in the Report of the Canadian Committee
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assumption to be false. 10 Moreover, the second statutory objective,
which assumes that officials are competent to predict risk with a
workable degree of accuracy, has also been shown to be false. "'
The risk of violence to people on the street cannot be controlled
through parole prediction. While the evidence in support of these
propositions will be examined shortly, the following questions must
be asked: are parole officials acting ultra vires the act in making
releases that cannot be shown to be in accordance with the stated
objectives of the act? How can officials "consider", in the words of
the act, that a given prisoner is fit for release and that his or her
release does not represent an undue risk when research shows that
the decision will be wrong at least fifty percent of the time?' 2 The
board would no doubt argue that the court should read into the act an
implied qualification that the board should simply do its best to meet
the objectives of the act. Such a qualification, however, should be
rejected, considering the importance of the values imperilled by the
board's actions. The right to life and freedom from assault, and the
privacy and integrity of the person, are not to be easily displaced on
the scales of social utility. Moreover, when the act requires officials
to "consider" that a prisoner does not represent an undue risk, it
imports an assumption of rational risk calculation. Indeed, as will
be argued later,' 3 such a test of rationality is implicitly required by
the rule of law, as well as by the Charter. If the board's approach to
risk calculation is so unreliable as to be no better than chance, how
can the board's actions be rationally related to its statutory mandate?
Is the board not caught in the position of being directed to do
something that it cannot do? In this sense, the Parole Act itself does
not pass the test of rationality; the board's actions under the act
likewise fail to meet the test. One way in which the board could
operate rationally within the confines of the act would be to decide
in each case that it is unable to determine the question of risk, and
that it is, therefore, unable to grant parole. The simple honesty of
such an exercise would be immensely preferable to the present
on Corrections(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969) at 277-278 (hereafter referred to as
the "Ouimet Report").
10. Wenk, E., Robison, J., and Smith, G., Can Violence be Predicted?(1972) 18
Crime & Delinq. at 393-402.
11. Supra, fn. 4.
12. Robison, J., "The California Prison, Parole and Probation System, Technical
Supplement No. 2, It's Time to Stop Counting", California Assembly, 1969.
13. Infra, fn. 114.
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practice of knowingly going through an intensely bureaucratic
attempt at the impossible.
Since the objectives of the act are impossible to achieve except by
change or accident, the board's assessments of rehabilitation or risk
must appear to be arbitrary and nonrational in a legal sense. The
rehabilitation of prisoners takes place, if at all, by chance or in ways
that cannot be shown to be linked in any causal sense to what the
board or prison officials do. Overall, the board's predictions as to
risk would not be worse if it simply flipped a coin. Although the
research data supporting the victim's claim in these respects is well
known, the importance of the data merits a summary at this point.
III. The State of the Art
As early as 1968, Bill Outerbridge, current chairman of the Parole
Board, warned of the failures of rehabilitation. 14 Later, in 1974,
Waller 15 compared inmates released on parole with penitentiary
inmates released at the expiration of their sentences in order to
determine whether prison programs or parole supervision could be
said to be effective in rehabilitating inmates, as measured by their
success at staying free of further crime. With respect to recidivism,
he found no significant differences between men released on
supervision and those released without parole or supervision, and
such differences as existed in favour of the parole group were
thought by Waller to be attributable not to the supervision, but to the
fact that the parole group had, in general, fewer previous
convictions and stronger ties with family, employment projects, and
the community. Prison programs and parole as such were not found
to be associated positively with rehabilitation.
Much of the research on these issues has been done in the United
States, where rehabilitation as a penal objective has been
assiduously pursued in various states for over fifty years. In the
same year that Waller published his research, Robert Martinson,
having done an exhaustive review of all published research on
rehabilitation, concluded that "nothing works" 16 This conclusion,
14. Outerbridge, W. The Tyranny of Treatment (1968) Can. Jo. Corr. 378-387.
15. Waller, I., Men Releasedfrom Prison (Toronto: U. Tor. Press, 1974).
16. Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison

Reform (1974) 35 The Public Interest, Spring Issue, 22-54; also Lipton, D.,
Martinson, R., and Wilks, J., The Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment: A
Survey of Treatment Evaluation Studies (N.Y.: Praeger, 1975).
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though at first disputed, has since been largely accepted and
corroborated by subsequent research, including the report of a
prestigious panel of experts working under the flagship of the
National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C. After reviewing
the research, including Martinson's earlier work, the panel reported
that:
• .. there is not now in the scientific literature any basis for any

policy or recommendations regarding rehabilitation of criminal
offenders. The data available do not present any consistent
evidence of efficacy that would lead to such recommendations,
but the quality of the work that has been done and the narrow
range of options explored militate against any policy reflecting a
final pessimism. On the basis of its review, the panel believes
that the magnitude of the task of reforming criminal offenders has
been consistently underestimated. It is clear that far more
intensive and extensive interventions will be required if
rehabilitation is to be possible; even then, there is no guarantee of
success. 17

While the research literature, including that relating to parole,
provides no basis for recommending parole or any other program as
a means of rehabilitating offenders, the panel duly noted
"occasional hints of interventions that may have promise", but
emphasized the need for caution at the policy level, saying that
". .. to recommend widespread implementation of the measures
would be irresponsible.' 8 It is worth emphasizing that the
deliberate conclusion of the above report states that, under present
circumstances, effecting rehabilitation is not even possible, let
alone probable. However, the Parole Act, relying on assumptions
current thirty years ago, continues to assume that rehabilitation is a
rational, attainable objective.
The lack of effectiveness of parole supervision is probably not
surprising in light of the fact that parole officers spend, on the
average, less than three hours per month on each file, 19 and only a
small proportion of this time, presumably, is spent in direct contact
with the parolee. Moreover, it is illusory to think that tax dollars
spent on increased supervision would reduce crime. For fifteen
years, California was involved in a carefully monitored program of
17. Sechrest, L. et al, eds., The Rehabilitationof Criminal Offenders: Problems
and Prospects(Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1979) at 34.
18. lbid, at 102.
19. Parole In Canada, Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Justice and

ConstitutionalAffairs (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974) at 98.
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the manipulation of parole supervision caseloads. Yet lighter
caseloads and more intensive supervision had no impact on
recidivism rates. 20 Despite this lack of evidence in support of
parole, researchers found value in parole release because it was
more "humanitarian", in that early release on parole tended to be
used as an instrument to level out overly harsh sentences among
basically similar cases. In commenting on these studies in his report
to the California Assembly, Robison noted that prisoners released
without any supervision on expiration of sentence had a lower
recidivism rate than persons released on parole. Robison accounted
for this by surmising that the parolees, being under supervision,
could be returned to prison for "technical breaches" of parole for example, failing to report - whereas those not under
supervision would only be recorded as a failure if arrested for
further offences.
The same phenomenon has been noted in Canada. In 1961, the
Solicitor General's Study of Conditional Release2 ' found no
significant difference in recidivism rates between prisoners released
on parole or temporary absences and those who were not. Indeed,
the evidence reported in that study suggested that even men released
on mandatory supervision do not have a significantly higher
recidivism rate than those released on parole: the Solicitor General's
study gives the recidivism rate, based on a 1980 survey, as thirteen
percent for parole prisoners and twenty-eight percent for those
under mandatory supervision, and, based on a 1974 survey, as
twenty-seven and thirty-seven percent, respectively. 22 As noted
above, Waller suggested in his study that such differences could be
accounted for not by supervision, but by the selection process itself.
It is widely stated in the press that the recidivism rate for mandatory
supervision is fifty percent, but according to parole staff, half of the
failure rate is accounted for by "technical violations". Regardless
of the differences in recidivism rates between the two groups,
however, the point remains that even increased resources would not
23
materially improve parole or mandatory supervision success rates.
20. Robison, supra, fn. 12.
21. Solicitor General's Study on Conditional Release (Ottawa: Ministry of the

Solicitor General, 1981).
22. Ibid, at 18, 23, 26.
23. Bill Outerbridge, Chairman of the National Parole Board, in addressing a
group of citizens at Duncan, B.C., shocked his audience with the following
understatement in relation to mandatory supervision cases: "The level of

The Parole Board: What Liability to Victims? 535

During the decade of the seventies, the impact of this social
science research began to be felt in government policy and planning
departments, and even at the legislative level. In Canada, the
penitentiaries underwent an official change of policy, abandoning
the goal of rehabilitation of inmates and replacing it with the
"opportunities" model. 2 4 Under this approach, the penitentiary no
longer holds out rehabilitation of inmates as an objective of
imprisonment, but, in recognition that rehabilitation, where it
occurs at all, is a little-understood, personal mystery, aims instead
at providing opportunities for prisoners to engage in programs that
should assist them in developing work skills, and in acquiring
education and social responsibility. In keeping with the view that
the state does not have the knowledge or capacity to reform and
change prisoners willy-nilly, attendance in prison programs is
voluntary. Moreover, provincial departments of correction, including that of British Columbia, have, for similar reasons,
abandoned the rehabilitative ideal. 25 At the legislative level in
Canada, indeterminate sentences were abolished to the extent that
they could be applied in Ontario and British Columbia under the
provisions of the Prisons and Reformatories Act. 26 Yet, for various
reasons, the obsolescent Parole Act escaped the move to reform,
27
notwithstanding public criticism of board practices.
In the United States, the impact of social science research
findings has also been felt at the legislative level. California
abandoned the rehabilitative approach, including indeterminate
sentencing laws, 28 which were once the most successful offspring
of that state's belief in its capacity to reform human character. Some

supervision - the intensity - is not very high. The actual face-to-face contact may
be once a week." See also the editorial, "Where Supervision is Meaningless",
Times Colonist, Victoria, B.C., March 3, 1983.

24. The Role of FederalCorrections in Canada (Ottawa: Ministry of the Solicitor
General, 1977); see also The Criminal Law in Canadian Society (Ottawa:
Government of Canada, 1982) at 62-63.
25. Programs of the Corrections Branch, Ministry of the Attorney General,
Victoria, at 21-22.
26. Prisons and Reformatories Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. p- 2 1, ss. 44, 55, and 150; as
am. by Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1977, S.C. 1976-1977, c. 53, s. 46.
27. McLean's Magazine, Dec. 7, 1981, at 10.
28. Lagoy, Stephen et al, A Comparative Assessment of Determinate Sentencing in

the Four PioneerStates [1978] Crime & Delinq. at 385, 400.
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states, including California 29 and Maine, 3 0 abolished parole release
with its discretionary timing geared to alleged predictions of
"readiness" for release and a low risk of recidivism. At the same
time, the implications of the social science data referred to above
continue to focus critical debate on pressing concerns for equality in
31
sentencing and protection of the public from undue risk.
The fallacy of rehabilitation is but one problem in considering the
obsolescence of the Parole Act. The second major problem is the
act's reliance on the assumption that, through prediction, risk of
future crime can be controlled and, by this means, the public can be
protected by parole not being granted or, once it is granted, through
revocation of parole. Within the last decade, it has become
abundantly clear that such predictions are fraught with error and are
unreliable.3 2 The best prediction is the prisoner's prior record, a
piece of information which the judge has before him at the time of
sentencing. Where there is an absence of a prior record or a very
limited history of previous crimes, predictions are notoriously wide
of the mark. As can be expected, most of the reported research has
been in respect of crimes of violence. After reviewing the reported
research, Monahan stated that ". . . the conclusion to emerge most
strikingly from these studies is the great degree to which violence is
over-predicted. Of those predicted to be dangerous, between 54 and
99 percent will be false." "False positives" in this context are
predictions of dangerousness that turn out to be false. "False
negatives" are predictions that the offender will not commit a crime
of violence if released, but, in fact, he does so. The frequency of
error in respect of false negatives, an error of particular interest to
the potential victim, can be gauged from the percentage of failures
on parole, that is, those cases which the board predicted would pose
no undue risk. According to the government's study on parole

29. Tonry, Michael, More Sentencing Reform in America (1982) Crim. L.R. at
157-167.
30. Zarr, M.,Sentencing (1976) 28 Maine L.R. 117.
31. Flowd, Jean and Young, Warren, Dangerousness and Criminal Justice
(London: Heinemann, 1981); Tonry, Michael, Real Offence Sentencing: The
Model Sentencing andCorrectionsAct (1981) 72 Jo. Crim. Law and Crim. 1550.
32. Monahan, J., "The Prediction of Violent Criminal Behavior: A Methodological Critique and Perspectus", in A. Blumstein et al, eds., Deterrence and
Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates
(Washington D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1978) at 244-269.
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releases, the failure rate on parole ranges from thirteen to
33
twenty-seven percent.
The American Psychological Association's Task Force, reporting
in 1978, found that the validity of psychologically-based predictions
of dangerous behaviour, made during sentencing and release
decision-making, was "extremely poor, so poor that one could
oppose their use on the strictly empirical grounds that psychologists
3 4
are not professionally competent to make such judgments."
Earlier, in 1974, Diamond reached similar conclusions:
Neither psychiatrists nor other behavioral scientists are able to
predict the occurrence of violent behavior with sufficient
reliability to justify the restriction of freedom of persons on the
basis of the label of potential dangerousness. Accordingly, it is
recommended that courts no longer ask such experts to give their
opinion of the potential dangerousness of any person, and that
psychiatrists and other behavioral scientists acknowledge their
inability to make such predictions
when called upon to do so by
35
courts and other legal agencies.
The above statements rest on a large number of research reports
which are critical of risk prediction. Wenk, Robison, and Smith, for
example, reported in 197236 on three large studies which were
undertaken for the California Department of Corrections. The
research in one study showed that eighty-six percent of those
predicted to commit a crime of violence while on parole did not do
so. In the second study, it was shown that for every correct
identification of a potentially aggressive individual, 326 persons
were incorrectly identified. In the third study, involving over 4,000
youths, the researchers concluded that the parole decision-maker
who used a history of actual violence as the sole predictor of future
violence would make nineteen false predictions of violence out of
every twenty predictions, yet "there is no other form of simple
classification available thus far that would enable him to improve on
this level of efficiency." ' 37 After reviewing the research and the
33. Solicitor General'sStudy, supra, fn. 21 at 23.
34. American Psychological Association, Report of the Task Force on the Role of
Psychology in the Criminal Justice System (1978); 33 American Psychologist,
1099, at 1110.
35. Diamond, B., The PsychiatricPredictionof Dangerousness (1974) 123 Univ.
Pa. L. Rev. 439-452.
36. Wenk, E., Robison, J., and Smith, G., Can Violence be Predicted (1972) 18
Crime & Delinq. at 393-420.
37. Ibid, at 400.
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problems of false positives and false negatives, Monahan, writing in
1979,38 was struck by the almost insurmountable barriers to
improving prediction. He stated that improvements to the prediction
of risk can "inform but not determine such public policy. The risks
must be borne by the false positives who languish in institutions and
the victims of false negatives who lie in the streets." 3 9 In a more
recent publication, Monahan, 40 while still acknowledging that
psychiatric predictions of dangerousness appear to be wrong two
times out of three, emphasizes that making the assessment is one
issue and acting on it is another. He underlines the fact that it is not
the role of clinicians and doctors to make "sociopolitical" decisions
affecting liberty; rather, it is up to courts and legislatures to decide
whether the clinician's prediction is reliable enough to justify action
affecting potential victims' rights to be secure in their persons.
One of the latest reports showing clear and convincing evidence
that predictions of dangerousness are highly inaccurate comes from
an analysis of felony defendants in New York, who were found
incompetent to stand trial and were judged by the courts, on the
basis of psychiatric reports, to be dangerous. 4 1 As measured by
subsequent behaviour upon release, those predicted to be dangerous
were virtually indistinguishable from those judged by the court not
to be dangerous. Fourteen percent (thirteen out of ninety-six) of
those released to the community by the courts were subsequently
arrested for committing violent crimes, while sixteen percent of
those found to be non-dangerous (eleven out of seventy) were
similarly arrested for violent crimes. The authors conclude that:
With few exceptions

. . .

there is no empirical evidence to

support the position that psychiatrists have any special expertise
in predicting dangerousness

. .

.It in fact appears that psychiat-

rists cannot even predict
accurately enough to be more often right
42
than they are wrong.
A somewhat more optimistic report of success in predictions of
violence comes from the Department of Corrections in the state of
38. Monaghan, J., supra, fn. 32.

39. Ibid, at 265.
40. Monahan, J.,Predicting Violent Behaviour (Beverley Hills: Sage Publications, 1981).
41. Cocozza, Joseph J. and Steadman, Henry J.,The Failure of Psychiatric
Predictionsof Dangerousness:Clear and Convincing Evidence (1976) 29 Rutgers
L.R. at 1084-1101.
42. lbid, at 1101.

The Parole Board: What Liability to Victims? 539

Michigan. 43 In that report, persons who were convicted of robbery,
sexual assault, or murder, who were first arrested before their
fifteenth birthdays, and who were found to be involved in serious
institutional misconduct while in prison were predicted to pose a
high risk of further assaults. These predictions turned out to be
wrong only sixty percent of the time, an improvement on other
reported research.
To conclude, the research strongly suggests that, insofar as the
parole-granting decision involves a prediction about risk, the
decisions are fraught with error and one would do equally well by
flipping coins. The Solicitor General's Release Study, referred to
earlier, points out that out of a possible 999 cases considered for
parole, the Parole Board will correctly identify as "safe risks" only
491, or less than half. The study concludes that if paroles were
simply granted at random, regardless of the factors involved, there
44
would be no significant difference in actual outcomes.
The failure to predict with accuracy or to prevent crime through
treatment or supervision undermines the statutory assumptions that
parole rehabilitates and is a controlled risk. It is noteworthy that
earlier reports upon which the government drew to enact parole
legislation and policy simply assumed, without examination, that
parole could protect and that predictive decisions could be made. 45
The closest those reports came to examining the predictive question
was to state that there comes a time in almost every inmate's life
when he is "ready" for release, the assumption being that he has
benefited as much as he is going to from the experience of
imprisonment, and that if he is released at the critical moment, he
will be likely to "make good" on the outside. The readiness myth
has been recognized for what it is, and was abandoned by the United
States Parole Board over twenty years ago. As Robison states:
" 'Optimum time for release' is a phrase which seems to presume
both knowledge of a specific point in time when recidivism is
unlikely and a readiness to act on that knowledge. There is no
evidence that either is present in today's system of processing
offenders.' '46 "Readiness for release" is a telling phrase, indicative

43. Monahan, supra, fn. 39 at 103.
44. Solicitor General's Study, supra, fn. 21 at 19.
45. Supra, fn. 7; see also the same generalized approach in Report of the Canadian
Committee on Corrections,supra, fn. 9.

46. Robison, supra, fn. 12 at 63.
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of the style of correctional reasoning in use twenty years ago. The
style of reasoning in the Fauteux Report in 1952, and even in the
Ouimet Report in 1969, made it natural simply to rely on the
received wisdom and ethical values of the day, without inquiry into
the empirical validity of proposed rules. It was a style of reasoning
that can best be characterized as charismatic, 4 7 in that it drew
strength primarily from the pronouncements of respected leaders,
and it is to be contrasted with a style of reasoning more prevalent in
the last forty years, a style that prefers empirical verification of
hypotheses and derives its legitimacy not so much from
unquestioned assumptions or political pronouncements, but from
the operational rationality of policy and law. This shift towards
legal rationality, apparent everywhere in an increasingly bureaucratic state, is given dramatic visibility in the enactment of the Charter
of Rights and in its demands in section 1 that infringements of rights
are not legitimate unless "demonstrably justified". 48 Surely, the
imperatives of the Charter forbid curtailment of rights of life or
personal security through state action that cannot be shown to be
rationally related to statutory objectives. The Ouimet Committee's
statement of faith, as follows, will not stand up against present-day
knowledge, nor will it satisfy modern criteria for valid curtailment
47. This analysis of the growth of law and types of legal decision-making borrows
from the analysis of Max Weber and his observation that rational law was a peculiar
rationalism of western culture that arises in part because of the characteristics of
western states, including their demand and need for a professional administration, a
specialized officialdom, and a rational law made by lawyers and judges,
professionally trained to interpret and apply law in rational processes. Weber, J.,
Law in Economy and Society (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954)
at 26.
48. The courts' continuing concern for legal rationality finds expression in the
Supreme Court of Canada decision relating to the validity of mandatory retirement
in light of the Human Rights Code prohibition against age discrimination. In
justifying the discrimination, McIntyre J. stated that the defendant must establish
that the discrimination is bona fide, thus involving not only an honestly held belief
as to the validity of the discrimination, but, in addition, an inquiry based on an
objective test establishing that the discrimination is reasonably necessary in order to
assure efficient job performance. The kind of evidence required for proper
decision-making at this level of the inquiry cannot be simply "impressionistic" or
anecdotal, as Weber would have put it, but objective in the sense of medical or
statistical evidence based upon observation and research: Ontario Human Rights
Commission, Dunlop, Hall and Gray v. Borough of Etobicoke (1982), 40 N.R.
159, (S.C.C.). Note the role of rationality under the Charter in R. v. Oakes (Feb.
2/83) Ont. C.A., unreported.
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of individual rights: ". . . the short term risks of parole are
calculated risks and in the opinion of this Committee are less than
the risks in the alternative of sudden and dramatic contrast between
49
incarceration and total freedom."
As indicated above, parole supervision cannot be shown to be
effective in preventing further crimes. The Parole Act's statutory
means of attempting to control risk through prediction and
revocation (which also assumes valid prediction) have no empirical
foundation which can establish a rational connection between these
means and the statutory ends, namely, rehabilitation and protection
against undue risk. Neither the Parole Board nor reported research
shows that prediction or revocation materially prevents the
commission of crimes. Nor are the earlier correctional assumptions
correct that a policy of outright release from prison with no
supervision would result in more recidivism than would release
under supervision. The research shows little difference in
recidivism rates between the two forms of release. It is for these
reasons that victims may justifiably assert that the Parole Act is
obsolescent and, in its obsolescence, poses a grave peril to personal
security and individual rights.
IV. Parole Practice
Given research studies pointing to the inability to accomplish reform as a penal objective or to predict the risk of recidivism with
reliability, what is the state of parole release practices? Who makes
the decisions to release, upon what information are the decisions
made, and upon what procedures are they designed to reduce the
risk of error?
While all releases from penitentiaries made prior to expiration of
sentence are within the sole discretion of the Parole Board, 50 the
board has delegated much of its authority to prison officials or, by
agreement, to provincial parole boards which have authority in
Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia to release prisoners in
provincial prisons. 5 ' The board itself, consisting of twenty-six
members, retains a modified central control over the release of only
those prisoners designated as dangerous, high risk, or notorious. All
49. The Ouimet Report, supra, fn. 9 at 33 1.
50. Parole Act, supra, fn. 2, s. 8.

51. Prisons and Reformatories Act, as amended, supra, fn. 26 at s. 151, and see
also Corrections Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 70, ss. 24-31, 47.
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offenders not so designated and serving terms of five years or less
(these constitute approximately sixty percent of the pententiary
population) 52 may be released on "temporary absence" by their
respective penitentiary wardens, while "day parole" or full parole
releases for these prisoners are within the sole discretion of regional
parole panels, consisting of at least two members. The panels visit
each penitentiary regularly to hold hearings on those cases where
prisoners, eligible under the regulations, have applied for some
form of parole release. Panel members hear an average of "8 to 10
[cases] a day, three weeks out of every four." 53 Understandably, in
a government enterprise as large as the penitentiary system, the
decision-making is bureaucratic in the sense that decisions must be
made not only within the framework of regulations governing
eligibility, but in accordance with a comprehensive and extensive
Policy and Procedures Manual which lays down guidelines for the
preparation of reports and for factors and criteria to be considered in
the decision to release, as well as procedures to be followed.
With respect to sentences of two years less a day, which are
served in provincial jails, the release decision may be delegated to a
provincial parole board or to wardens of the local prison. In
Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia, the National Parole Board
has delegated power to provincially constituted parole boards. In the
other provinces, prison officials may release such prisoners, at their
discretion, intermittently on temporary absences. In such cases, a
prisoner credited with full remission of sentence would be released
outright after having served two-thirds of his sentence. Parole and
parole supervision do not restrict him unless he voluntarily applies
to the Parole Board to be released and is released prior to the
two-thirds mark. Because of the time necessary to complete the
paper work on a parole release application, prisoners with sentences
of three months or less are, for all practical purposes, exempt from
the parole process. It is also helpful to understand that parole
decision-making is decentralized on a regional basis. While certain
cases involving allegedly high risk require some decision-making at
both regional and national levels of the parole bureaucracy, in the
ordinary case the decision to release or not to release is made at a
52. Basic Facts About Corrections in Canada (Ottawa: Ministry of the Solicitor

General, 1982) p. 16.
53. Couperthwaite v. National Parole Board Fed. Ct. Can. (Trial Div.), Wnpg.,
June 30/82, T-3763-81.
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relatively low level of the prison and parole hierarchy. As outlined
in Couperthivaite v. National Parole Board,54 the preparation for a
parole hearing commences several months prior to the hearing date
through preparation of reports at the local prison level. These relate
to health, institutional behaviour, educational or other diagnostic
reports, police and community assessment reports, comments from
the sentencing judge, if any, and psychological and psychiatric
reports, if any. 5 5 All information relevant to the release decision is
reviewed in advance by two members of the penitentiary service,
namely, the prisoner's parole service officer and a prison officer
known as a Living Unit Development Officer (LUDO). In reliance
on these reports, these officials prepare summaries on prescribed
forms, which, together with written material upon which they are
based, are given to the members of the Parole Board a week or two
in advance of the hearing at the prison. Upon completion of the
hearing, these parole board members may recommend that parole be
granted or denied.
Considering the critical nature of the parole release decision in
the context of risk assessment, it is useful to consider the
conclusions drawn by the Law Reform Commission of Canada on
the quality of the information in parole files. After summarizing the
types of reports compiled, the type of information collected, and the
summaries used to enable more efficient assimilation of data,
Carriere and Silverstone commented upon the duplication of
information and the apparent cumbersome and complex nature of
the process. They observed that Parole Board members were not
able to read all of the material on file, but instead relied heavily on
the summary reports. These summaries themselves, however, were
found all too frequently to show statements of belief that were
unsupported by fact or which betrayed a lack of a clear
understanding as to what facts were relevant to the parole decision,
including, for example, whether factors relevant to prison discipline
56
or severity of offence should be relevant to rehabilitation and risk.
After noting "inadequate, inconsistent and late preparation", the
authors clearly felt that release decisions based on such case
preparations were not acceptable.
54. Ibid.
55. Carriere, Pierre, and Silverstone, S., The Parole Process (Ottawa: Law
Reform Commission of Canada, 1976) at 45-50.
56. Ibid, at 57-58; 75-76; 121-143.
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Psychiatric reports themselves, although generally accorded
considered weight in risk assessment, were also found to be faulty
and incomplete. The Law Reform Commission's study of the parole
process found some psychiatric reports to contain opinion that was
unsupported by statements of fact and recommendations that were
couched in obscure terminology, and, all too frequently, the reports
failed to address themselves to specific facts required for a rational
discrimination between the violent and the nonviolent. 57 Monahan
has commented at length on the incomplete, inadequate, and
misleading quality of psychiatric reports, in general, for predicting
violence:
There are many mistakes that a psychiatrist or psychologist can
make in predicting violent behaviour. He or she can mis-score a
test, forget to ascertain a relevant fact, or simply be unaware of
the research findings in the area. Several sources of error,
however, appear to occur so routinely in the prediction of violent
behaviour, even by generally competent clinicians, that it is
worthwhile to single them out for special attention. The four most
common "blind spots" in the clinical prediction of violent
behavior appear to be: (1) lack of specificity in defining the
criterion; (2) ignoring statistical base rates; (3) relying on
illusory co-relations; and (4) failing to incorporate situational or
environmental information. 58
Monahan concludes by suggesting some practical questions which
clinicians should address if predictions about violence are to gain
reliability. He includes the following checklist among the factors to
be addressed:
1. Is it a prediction of violent behavior that is being requested?
2. Am I professionally competent to offer an estimate of the
probability of future violence?
3. Are any issues of personal or professional ethics involved in this
case?
4. Given my answers to the above questions, is this case an
appropriate one in which to offer a prediction?
5. What events precipitated the question of the person's potential
for violence being raised, and in what context did these events
take place?
6. What are the person's relevant demographic characteristics?
7. What is the person's history of violent behavior?
57. Ibid, at 51, 53.
58. Monahan, supra, fn. 39 at 57-58.
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8. What is the base rate of violent behavior among individuals of
this person's background?
9. What are the sources of stress in the person's current
environment?
10. What cognitive and affective factors indicate that the person
may be predisposed to cope with stress in a nonviolent manner?
11. How similar are the contexts in which the person has used
violent coping mechanisms in the past to the contexts in which
the person likely will function in the future?
12. In particular, who are the likely victims of the persons' violent
behavior, and how available are they?
59
13. What means does the person possess to commit violence?
Based on these criteria of professional standards in risk assessment,
present procedures appear to be inadequate.
There is no reason to believe that reliability and consistency of
information is a problem peculiar to Canadian parole boards.
Gottfredson and Wilkins noted the problem of information overload
and unreliability in American agencies as well. 60 The problem of
consistency and accuracy in the use of relevant facts warrants
serious attention and has led to suggestions for written guidelines to
parole decision-making. 6 1 The movement towards parole
guidelines 62 is part of the movement towards greater rationality in
decision-making. Under an earlier model of decision-making, for
example, the United States Parole Board would meet with the
applicant in order to gain some intuitive feel for the applicant's
rehabilitation, repentance, willingness to accept responsibility, or
self-understanding. The decision to release or to refuse parole under
such a model was said to be entirely discretionary - that is, based
on the judgments of individual men and women. Formally
articulated criteria, such as are contained in parole guidelines, were
used infrequently. 63 Under this traditional approach, the release
59. lbid, at 160.
60. Gottfredson, D.M., Wilkins, L., and Hoffman, P., Guidelinesfor Parole and
Sentencing (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1978).
61. lbid; see also Nuffield, supra, fn. 4.
62. Kress, Jack M., "Reforming Sentencing Laws: An American Perspective", in
E. Grosman, ed., New Directions in Sentencing (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980)
97-116.
63. This description represents the approach formerly taken by the National Parole
Board, Ottawa; see the Ouimet Report, supra, fn. 9 at 339-343; see also F. P.
Miller, "Parole", in W.T. McGrath, ed., Crime and Its Treatment in Canada (2d.
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decision was not always measurably related to rehabilitation; it
could be related to the risk of committing a further offence on
release, or to the amount of time the offender had served and the
severity of the offence. 64 Hawkins' study of the New York Parole
Board showed decision-making to be the result of a wide array of
factors, including factors predictive of risk, punitive factors,
prison-related considerations, and personal impressions. 6 5 What
Parole Board members said they used as criteria, however, could
not be shown to be statistically correlated with criteria associated by
the members of the board with specific decisions. In other words,
there appeared to be a gap between what board members did, what
they said they did, and what the statute directed them to do.
As was already noted, there is some evidence that Canadian
parole boards may also consider nonstatutory criteria in making
parole release decisions. Carriere and Silverstone concluded that
cases that attracted a substantial amount of publicity or were a cause
celebre for various reasons were decided by factors other than risk
or rehabilitation. "Allowing different and more onerous treatment
for reasons unrelated to an inmate's assessed capacity for a
successful parole creates the impression that the voting procedures
were designed to protect the Parole Board rather than to help the
inmate." ' 66 It might be thought that greater consistency in
application or use of parole criteria could be achieved by requiring
board members to give reasons for decisions. While National Parole
Board procedures require that oral reasons for decisions be given,
the above-mentioned study found that such reasons tended to be
general, and sometimes were not reasons at all. In commenting
on written reasons, the authors concluded that reasons tended to be
comments on the case, rather than reasons in relation to the criteria
67
upon which parole grants or denials are supposed to be based.
The inadequacy of this type of decision-making for a system of
law purporting to adhere to principled decision-making, rationality,
and equality under the law has encouraged the movement toward
ed., Toronto: MacMillan, 1976) 376, 442, at 394-399; for a description of the
approach of the U.S. Board of Parole, see Payton v. U.S. (1981) 636 F. 2d. 132,
(U.S. Ct. of Appeals, 5th Cir.) at 139.
64. Stanley, David T., PrisonersAmong Us, The Problems of Parole(Washington

D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1976).
65. For a summary, see Stanley, ibid, at 61.
66. Carriere and Silverstone, supra, fn. 55 at 97.
67. Ibid, at 100.
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parole guidelines. However, these too have their problems, and
may not entirely meet the victim's concern that official decisionmaking violates his common law or constitutional rights. 68 The
victim asserts not only that the Parole Act is obsolescent and in
violation of his constitutionally protected right to life and personal
security, but that the nature of the parole decision-making process is
so fraught with considerations of faulty, erroneous, or irrelevant
matter, with respect to risk prediction, that the board's actions are
capricious or amount to an error in law and a loss of jurisdiction.
Where the prediction process is professionally suspect, the parole
release decision may be without jurisdiction. That is to say, if the
fact-gathering and risk-assessing process is unacceptably riddled
with error, omission, and reference to irrelevant facts, should not
the court be invited to find that the board made an error in law or,
alternatively, made a capricious decision and, therefore, acted
without jurisdiction? Admittedly, a finding that the act is
obsolescent or that the board acted without jurisdiction does not lead
to a common law remedy of damages, but it may ground an
application under the Charter for a section 24 remedy for
unconstitutional deprivation of life or security of person. 6 9 More
will be said of this later.
V. The Victim and the Courts
Before considering what practical remedy, based on any constitutional or Charter violation, might be sought in the courts, it will be
instructive to see whether the common law provides the victim with
an effective remedy. What is the victim's position where he or she
has been assaulted by a person on parole or on another form of
supervised release from prison? Let us assume that the victim is not
interested in getting a declaration that the parole authorities acted
unfairly or otherwise, nor that the victim is interested in other
procedural remedies; assume, for the moment, that what the victim
wants is damages.
There is no question that the victim can proceed directly against
68. Genego, W.J., Goldberger, P.D., and Mackson, V.C., Parole Release
Decision-Making and the Sentencing Process (1975) 84 Yale L.J. 810-902;
Alschuler, Albert W., Sentencing Reform and ParoleRelease Guidelines (1980) 51
U. Colo. L. Rev. 237-245.
69. Under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, any law that is inconsistent with the
Charter is of no force or effect.
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the wrongdoer in a tort action for damages and that he may recover;
the defendant, however, is unlikely to have substantial resources
and is unlikely to be able to pay any judgment recovered against
him. Can the victim sue the federal parole or correctional officials
for negligence in releasing or in supervising the offender? 70 By
virtue of federal legislation, 7" the federal Crown can, with some
exceptions, 72 be sued in tort, thus removing a former immunity
conferred by the common law. 73 The victim who sues the parole
board or correctional officers, however, is not going to have clear
sailing. It is true that tribunals and agencies such as the Parole
Board and the Correctional Service of Canada may be held
vicariously liable for the acts of their employees. 74 The problems
arise out of the reluctance of the courts to hold officials liable in
damages for negligent acts and the failure of the courts to develop a
clear theory of why or how this should be done.
The problems are illustrated by the decision of the British
Columbia Court of Appeal in Toews v. MacKenzie. 75 In that case,
the plaintiff sued the warden of a Canadian penitentiary in
negligence for damages arising out of injuries she suffered as a
passenger in a car driven by a prison inmate who was on a
temporary absence pass, issued by the warden. It appeared that the
plaintiff, who had met the prisoner while he was out on an earlier
temporary absence, had taken up a close relationship with the
prisoner and was claimed by him as his "old lady". There was
evidence that she was intimidated by his over-bearing manner, and
she said that, on the day in question, she felt she had no option but
to go with him in the car as he directed. The prisoner had what was
described as a long, if somewhat petty, criminal record, including
narcotics convictions. He had a drinking problem, but in
preparation for his parole release plans, he formed an Alcoholics
Anonymous group in the prison and was serving as president of the
70. Supra, fn. 3.

71. Crown Liability Act, R.S.C. 1970, c-38 and Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970
(2d Supp.) c. 10. The Crown in the right of the province may also be sued under
relevant provincial legislation. See, for example, Crown Proceeding Act, R.S.B.C.
1979, c. 86.
72. Generally, see Goldenberg, supra, fn. 3.
73. Hogg, supra, fn. 3. See also Judson, John, and Laidlaw, Donald, The Legal
Liability of the ConstitutionalSystem (1971) Queens Law Jo. 127-166.
74. Ibid.
75. Supra, fn. 5.
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group when he was granted the temporary absence passes. He had
also been cleared, by the Parole Board, to be released on a day
parole, and this fact, combined with favourable pre-release reports
from the warden's staff, was relied on by the warden in the granting
of temporary absence passes to the prisoner in order that the
prisoner might seek employment in his trade as a mechanic prior to
his day parole release date.
The plaintiff sued both the warden and the prisoner, and
recovered a large judgment against the prisoner, but he had
disappeared and the judgment was worthless. As against the
warden, the plaintiff argued that there was negligence in the
decision to release the prisoner and negligence in his supervision.
She relied on facts which showed that, upon release on the
temporary absences, the prisoner was frequently late in returning to
the prison at night and, in so doing, was in violation of a condition
of his pass. In addition, instead of being steadily employed as a
mechanic, as was required, he did some body work on an old car
with a friend, but also left this work from time to time to drive to
neighbouring communities, contrary to the conditions of the pass;
he also drank during the day, sold narcotics, and visited with his
friends, including the plaintiff, at various motels. On the day in
question, he was drunk and driving, and in breach of the conditions
of his release. The prisoner drove the car off the road and caused the
plaintiff grave injuries, resulting in her becoming a paraplegic.
First, it was clear that the warden was acting within his powers
and duties under the Parole Act; therefore, he could not be said to be
acting ultra vires. Since his actions were intra vires, the plaintiff
then argued that the warden should be liable in negligence if the
release or supervision decisions fell into a class of "operational",
rather than "discretionary", matters. The court ruled that no
liability could attach to public officials in the making of
discretionary or policy decisions unless there was evidence of bad
faith or improper purpose, but in this case there was none. The court
was willing to consider liability if the release and supervision were
merely "operational", that is, if it consisted of the carrying out of
policy and required no exercise of discretion. Relying on English
cases, the court ruled that the release and the supervision were both
"discretionary"; thus, even if the warden had been careless in
failing to make proper inquiries before release or in failing to ensure
adequate supervision, he had acted "in good faith" in a
discretionary matter and could not be held liable.

550 The Dalhousie Law Journal

The court went on to say that even if it were wrong and the
warden had exercised "operational"
powers in releasing or
supervising the prisoner, the plaintiff had failed in the second part of
her argument to show that there was a sufficiently proximate
relationship between the warden and the plaintiff so as to require the
warden to owe a duty of care. This is the foundation of an action in
negligence, in accordance with the law as set out in the leading
English case of Anns. 76 To establish a "proximate" relationship
between herself and the warden, the plaintiff would have to show
herself to be a person who might be a "neighbor", in the sense that
the relationship was such that it was reasonably foreseeable by the
warden that, unless he took reasonable care in release and
supervision, his action would likely cause injury to the plaintiff or to
a class of persons of which she was a member. Whether any person
fell within the ambit of this "eye of vigilance" would depend upon
all the circumstances. In refusing to find a duty of care, the court, in
Toews, followed the conservative approach of the House of Lords in
7
Dorset Yacht. 7
In Dorset Yacht, the plaintiff's yachts had been damaged by some
Borstal boys escaping from an island while under the supervision of
prison officers. Knowing that several of the boys had a history of
escape and knowing of the yachts anchored off the island, the prison
officers had, nevertheless, failed to keep watch at night, thus
allowing the escape to materialize. Under those circumstances, the
House of Lords was asked to consider whether a duty of care was
owed to the yacht owners. Lord Diplock focussed on the narrow
circumstances of damage done in the course of an escape. He said
that, under the circumstances, it was reasonably foreseeable that,
unless reasonable care was taken, the boys would attempt escape
and, since they were on an island, it was reasonably foreseeable that
they would board the yachts in attempting to do so. The injury to the
plaintiff's property was, therefore, foreseeable, and a duty of care
was owed. But the House of Lords emphasized that a duty of care
would not be owed to all the world and that each case must be
carefully considered on its facts.
In Toews, the court said, "In the case at bar, I do not think, by
the widest stretch of the imagination, it could be said that the
respondent Stanowski ought reasonably to have foreseen that if he
76. Anns. v. London Borough of Merton, [1977]2 All E.R. 492 (H.L.) 498.
77. Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd., [1970] 2 All E.R. 294 (H.L.) at 334.
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granted Warren temporary absence permits Warren would, by his
negligent driving, injure the appellant who had placed herself in a
relationship to Warren which because of her fear of him denied her
the opportunity to avoid his negligent conduct." '7 8 The reasoning of
the court, in focussing narrowly on the peculiar circumstances or
manner in which the injury arose, was foreshadowed, as we have
seen, by Lord Diplock's emphasis on escape. In Toews, however,
the court carries the approach to an unsatisfactory extreme. First,
the court appears to suggest that the risk must be foreseeable with
respect to the actual victim, but this cannot be the implication, for
the cases are replete with examples showing that it is enough if there
is foreseeable injury to a class of persons of which the plaintiff is
one, such as a class of yacht owners, consumers, or, for example,
passengers or users of highways. Second, the court suggests that
the very manner of the injury must be foreseeable in order to
recover: could the warden have foreseen that the plaintiff would
have placed herself in such a relationship to the prisoner that she
could not exercise normal prudence in refusing to go for a ride in a
car with him? This is an extreme view of what the law requires. The
writers and the case law generally establish that it is not necessary to
show that this particular accident and this particular damage were
probable; it is sufficient to show that the accident is of a class that
might well be anticipated as one of the reasonable and probable
results of the wrongful act . 7 9 Foresight of ulterior harm is not to be
judged by a narrow test of what the reasonable man would foresee in
precise detail.
The Toews case, in erring in this regard, is in the same class as
Mauney v. Gulf Refining Co. 80 In that case, the defendant allowed a
fire to start at a filling station in a small town. Alarmed at the shouts
of panic and disaster, the female proprietor of a cafe across the
street rushed to save her two-year old child, and, in so doing, tripped
over a chair and suffered a miscarriage. She sued the defendant
company in negligence, but the court held that the company could
not have foreseen that she would trip over a chair. On this approach,
recovery for ulterior harm would hardly ever be allowed; that the
78. Toews, supra, fn. 5 at 494.
79. Hart, H.L.A. and Honore, A.M., Causation in the Law (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1959) 233 quoting Haynes v. Harwood, [1935] 1 K.B. 146, at 156, per
Greer L.J.
80. Mauney v. GulfRefining (1942), 9 So. 2d. 780 (Sup. Ct. Miss., in bane).
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case is an exception is shown by the generality of the cases where
recovery is allowed if injury is foreseeable, although the particular
details are not. The peculiar reasoning in Toews does appear to be
open to criticism on grounds of inconsistency with general
principles. The result, however, may be understandable, considering that the defendant was a prison official, and that the
plaintiff was a simple volunteer and was opposing counsel's
argument (which was rejected) that she consented to the risk.
From what has already been said, it is clear that apparently simple
words, such as "duty" and "foreseeability", mask a host of
conflicting value and policy considerations which the court may or
may not openly take into account. Cases decided on the basis of "no
duty" or "no causal connection" are particularly open to this
criticism. 8 1 More recently, the courts have acknowledged the need
to frankly weigh factors and values of a policy nature. In Anns, Lord
Wilberforce suggested a useful approach. First, the court should
determine whether there was a prima facie duty, and then, if such a
duty is found, the court should address policy or other reasons as to
why the duty should be negated or restricted or why damages should
be limited. Lord Wilberforce stated this as follows:
First one has to ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer
and the person who has suffered damage there is a sufficient
relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the
reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part
may be likely to cause damage to the latter, in which case a prima
facie duty of care arises. Secondly, if the first question is
answered affirmatively, it is necessary to consider whether there
are any considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or
limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to whom
it is
82
owed or the damages to which a breach of it may give rise.
Although the court in Toews made reference to Anns, it adopted
such a narrowly practical test of foresight as to reduce "reasonable
foreseeability" to an arbitrary absurdity, for in one sense,
everything is foreseeable, but on the approach adopted in Toews,
almost nothing would be.8 3 Furthermore, the Toews case is less than
compelling and is positively discouraging in the way it classified the
warden's acts as "discretionary". The distinction between
81. See Epstein, R.A., A Theory of Strict Liability (San Francisco: Cato Institute,
1980).
82. Anns, supra, fn. 76 at 498.

83. Hart and Honore discuss this problem, supra, fn. 79 at 232-33.
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"discretionary" and "operational" is fairly recent in Canadian law;
in fairness, courts have had but few opportunities to clarify the
dividing line between the two. 84 What is regrettable is that Toews
adds nothing to that needed clarification. "Discretionary" and
"operational" are but conclusions, and even "operational"
matters, that is, matters involving the application of policy, may, in
many instances, involve choice and discretion. For example, they
may involve a doctor's report on the fitness of a patient in a hearing
to commit under the Mental Health Act,8 5 or the carrying out of an
86
inspection of building foundations by a building inspector.
The court in Toews appeared content to accept Lord Diplock's
conclusion, in Dorset Yacht, that release and supervision are
discretionary matters. With respect, Lord Diplock himself is not
compelling in his analysis and gives undue weight to government
interests at the expense of individual rights. As Lord Diplock noted,
the setting up of a Borstal system including a scheme of supervised
release is provided for by statute in England in the interest of the
rehabilitation of offenders. Permitting actions in negligence against
the prison service, he observed, brings into operation the
consideration and balancing of many factors and conflicting sets of
interests, including the interest in release, held by the Borstal boys,
the interest in rehabilitation, held by the public, and the interests of
persons likely to be harmed by such releases. The court, said Lord
Diplock, was not equipped to make such policy decisions involving,
as they must, prison programs, supervision, and possible resultant
87
injury to private persons:
These interests, unlike those of a person who sustains damage to
his property or person by the tortious act or omission of another,
do not fall within any category of property or rights recognized in
English law as entitled to protection by a civil action for
damages. The conflicting interests of the various categories of
persons likely to be affected by an act or omission of the
custodian of a Borstal trainee which has as its consequence his
release or his escape are thus of different kinds for which in law
84. Bona fide legislative action, at common law, is beyond the reach of the courts;
Welbridge Holdings Ltd. v. Winnipeg (1971) S.C.R. 957. A decision by the Fish

and Wildlife Branch to feed elk in winter was characterized as discretionary and not
operational: Diversified Holdings Ltd. v. British Columbia (1981) 35 B.C.L.R.
349 (B.C.S.C.); alsoNielsen v. Kamploops (1982) 31 B.C.L.R. 311 (B.C.C.A.).
85. Everett v. Griffiths, [1921] 1 A.C. 631 (H.L.).
86. Anns, supra, fn. 76.
87. Dorset Yacht, supra, fn. 77, at 331-32.
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there is no common basis for comparison. If the reasonable man
when directing his mind to the act or omission which has this
consequence ought to have in contemplation persons in all the
categories directly affected and also the general public interest in
the reformation of young offenders, there is no criterion by which
a court can assess where the balance lies between the weight to be
given to one interest and that to be given to another. The material
relevant to the assessment of the reformative effect upon trainees
of release under supervision or of any relaxation of control while
still under detention is not of a kind which can be satisfactorily
elicited by the adversary procedure and rules of evidence adopted
in English courts of law or of which judges (and juries) are suited
by their training and experience to assess the probative value.
These considerations lead me to the conclusion that neither the
intentional release of a Borstal trainee under supervision, nor the
unintended escape of a Borstal trainee still under detention which
was the consequence of the application of a system of relaxed
control intentionally adopted by the Home Office as conducive to
the reformation of trainees, can have been intended by Parliament
to give rise to any cause of action on the part of any private
citizen unless the system adopted was so unrelated to any purpose
of reformation that no reasonable person could have reached a
bona fide conclusion that it was conducive to that purpose. Only
then would the decision to adopt it be ultra vires in public law.
Lord Diplock's protest that the court is not competent to balance
conflicting values or interests in such matters as the decision to
release a parolee or to impose conditions of his supervision is not
convincing. Because of a lack of judicial competence in these
matters, he says, such issues must remain behind the "discretionary" veil. First, as was already noted, 88 the decision to grant or
deny parole in the ordinary case is made at a relatively low level of
the agency bureaucracy, in accordance with well-defined procedures and following criteria for decision-making which are spelled
out in advance by the higher administration in policy manuals. The
factual basis for the decision is open to inspection on the file. In
reviewing such a decision, the court is not being cast adrift on an
uncharted sea, but is being asked to review well-marked channels of
agency decision-making. Nor is the nature of the process markedly
different in more serious cases of risk, where board procedure
changes only to the extent of requiring an additional two votes on
the decision to release, votes that are obtained from board members
at the Ottawa office upon perusal of the paper file alone. The criteria
88. Carriere and Silverstone, supra, fn. 55.
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for this type of case, as in cases of lesser risk, are laid down in
89
advance, the procedure for file preparation also remains the same,
and again, the factual foundations for the decision are available to
the prisoner or his counsel for inspection. Faced with this type of
detailed agency procedure and documentation, it does not seem
credible to argue that a court is incompetent to assess whether, in
any given case, the agency took reasonable care in assessing the
issue of risk.
Lord Diplock's reasoning is open to question on a second ground.
He states that "there is no criterion by which a court can assess
where the balance lies.

.

.", yet he immediately acknowledges that

there is such a criterion, saying, "the system adopted was so
unrelated to any statutory purpose that no reasonable person could
believe that the means were conducive to that purpose." In such
cases, Lord Diplock states, the agency's action is ultra vires.
Another line of cases illustrates the courts' willingness and
competence to reach behind the discretionary veil to decide, for
example, whether discretion has been exercised bona fide or in
accordance with the terms of the statute. Thus, a minister's decision
to close certain hospitals for budgetary reasons was ruled invalid,
since the statute conferring the powers on him did not permit
closures for budgetary reasons. 90 So, too, a court will look into
discretionary matters to see if they have been carried out in
compliance with the law, including regulations, directives, or
policy guidelines. 9 1 If the courts have at hand a workable criterion
of reasonableness to determine whether the means chosen are
conducive to the statutory purposes, do they not equally have at
hand a standard of reasonableness to determine whether or not the
assessment of risk was made negligently? As Monahan has pointed
out, there are criteria of competence in these matters to which the
courts might look; 92 in addition, there are agency guidelines,
procedures, and criteria for assessment, all of which should be of
help to the court in determining whether or not there was negligence
or incompetence in assessing risk. Thus, the issue is not whether the
89. Ibid, at 96-97. The authors note that, in practice, board members take a further
factor into account in causes celebre, namely, the adverse impact of publicity.
90. Re Doctors Hospital and Minister of Health (1976) 68 D.L.R. (3d) 220 (Ont.

Div. Ct.).
91. Capital Cities Communication Inc. v. C.R.T.C., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141, 81

D.L.R. (3d) 609; Molot, Administrative Discretion, supra, fn. 3 at 360-70.
92. Monahan, supra, fn. 39.
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court will substitute its decision for that of the agency, but whether
the agency has complied with minimal standards of reasonableness
and competence in assessing risk.
In Toews, the evidence showed that the warden addressed his
mind to the statutory purposes of rehabilitation and risk, and, on the
basis of reports compiled in the usual course by prison and parole
service officers, concluded that the prisoner should be released.
Surely, however, a standard of reasonableness or competence
cannot be justified on the bald assertion that reports were considered
and followed. Suppose the reports themselves never addressed the
question of the prisoner's likely return to drinking and the risk of
highway accidents? If the reports or the supervision were so riddled
with error that no reasonable person could have confidence in them,
should the courts continue to erect a protective shield of immunity,
barring the victim from his remedy?
While official immunity is in the process of being whittled away
by the notion of operational matters, the courts have not made clear
what criteria are to be used in drawing the line between an immune
discretionary wrong and a tortious operational wrong. The evolution
of the distinction has not been without its difficulties; it was first
93
clearly established in the Anglo-Canadian world in the Anns case,
decided by the House of Lords three years prior to Toews. In Anns,
the city was held liable for the negligence of a building inspector
who failed to properly inspect the foundations of a house under
construction. The result was that, when the house was completed, a
purchaser suffered loss in having to make repairs arising from the
faulty foundations. The court stated that they would not review the
decision of whether or not to inspect, as that was a discretionary
matter, but once a decision to inspect was made, matters would
become operational and the court would review matters to see if
there was negligence in the inspection. The case has subsequently
been applied in similar contexts in British Columbia, 94 but in
Toews, while accepting Anns, the court found that the decision to
release and the supervision itself were discretionary matters.
What, then, is the dividing line between discretionary and
operational issues? Clearly, the courts do not want to get involved in
issues calling for a balancing of legislative facts, such as budgetary
93. Anns, supra, fn. 76.
94. Barratt v. North Vancouver (1978) 89 D.L.R. (3d) 473 (B.C.C.A.); Neilsen
v. Kamloops (1981) 19 C.C.L.T. 146 (B.C.C.A.).
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allocations and priorities in accomplishing statutory objectives.
Although it is rarely articulated, there is a sense of a separation of
the powers at work here; it is not simply that the court lacks a
workable criterion for balancing conflicting factors and values.
Speaking generally and from a functional point of view, the higher
up the administrative ladder a decision is made, the more reluctant
courts will be to intervene; the lower down the ladder, the more
likely the court will be to find the agency decision to be operational.
Baldly put, discretionary matters involve discretion in the
decision-making and in the making of policy, while operational
matters involve merely the execution of policy.
The distinction has been recognized in the United States for
somewhat longer than it has in Canada; there, too, the distinction is
used to mark the boundary between official immunity and
accountability in the common law courts. A recent United States
case that clarifies the line between discretionary and operational
matters and illuminates some of the policy considerations is Payton
v. U.S. 95 The plaintiff in that case sued in negligence under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, an act permitting citizens to claim
damages for the unlawful deprivation of life or personal security, or
of other rights, suffered at the hands of federal officials. The act
gives an immunity to all actions of a "discretionary nature".
Suffice it to say that the discretionary/operational distinction
appears to be made on lines parallel to that discussed above in the
English and Canadian cases. In Payton, the husband and children,
as survivors, brought the action for the wrongful death of the mother
who had been brutally raped and murdered by a man released on
parole. It was found that the prisoner had a history of violent sexual
offences; medical reports on file showed him to be a homicidal
psychotic. A prison psychiatric report on file stated that the prisoner
was in need of long-term psychiatric care, care he did not receive.
He was released two years after the medical reports in question. The
plaintiff alleged that the release had been made negligently in
disregarding or in failing to note the medical reports, and that there
was negligence in the supervision of the prisoner. The defendants
claimed that the release and supervision were discretionary matters
and within the statutory immunity.
The United States Court of Appeals, faced with ample authority
favouring the defendants, proceeded to construct a framework of
95. Payton v. U.S. (1981), 636 F. 2d 132 (U.S. Ct. of Appeals, 5th Cir.).
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analysis to assist in characterizing actions as discretionary or
operational. It was unwilling simply to look at the level at which the
action or decision was made and to conclude, on that basis alone,
that if the decision was made high up in the administration, it must
be discretionary, but it must be operational if it was made at the
"action line", or in the day-to-day administration of the agency's
work. The nature of the decision-making in question had to be
understood, and to this end, the court examined the parole release
process inside the Board of Parole and found it to be based on
policies and express guidelines, such that decisions in actual cases
were largely a matter of applying written directives and criteria:
The present system has been said to "structure discretion" and to
reflect a change in the system's goals away from individualization toward equality of treatment under generalized rules. This
appears to be a valid characterization. As a result of this
standardization the process certainly takes on a fixed and
mechanical flavor, with the rendering of determinations made in
a somewhat ministerial manner and at a lower administrative
level than previously. Yet this characterization 96
is merely the
starting point for our analysis, not the denouement.
According to the court, it was also necessary to consider and
analyze the different interests involved, namely, those of the injured
party, the government's interest in a parole release program, and
finally, the courts' capacity for deciding the case.
As for the plaintiff's claim, the court stated that the more serious
and isolated the nature of the loss, the more difficult it was to assert
that the individual alone should be expected to bear that loss as an
incidental cost of acceptable social or governmental action. The
government's action, on the other hand, was to be assessed, in part,
by determining at what level of the administrative hierarchy the
injury took place. This would assist the court in determining
whether the rules of the agency were themselves under attack, or
merely their application. Sensitive as well to the value of the
separation of powers implicit in this characterization process, the
court stated that in assessing the agency's claim, it may be
necessary to consider whether the "activity is one traditionally or
constitutionally exercised by a coordinate branch of government or
one fraught with political or policy overtones such as the feasibility
or practicality of a program, or prosecutorial discretion, or foreign
affairs. Further, a careful assessment of the actual burden, in both
96. Ibid, at 142.
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the long and short run, on governmental activities and the
97
alternatives available ought to be made."
In considering the courts' capacity to decide such cases, the 5th
Circuit identified the following factors: (1) whether a tort suit
provides a relevant standard of care for evaluating the impugned
action, based on standards of professional care, reasonableness, or
otherwise; and (2) whether the factors for decision are primarily of
such a political, social, or economic nature as the court has had
previous experience in dealing with, as, for example, in cases
relating to human rights or anti-trust litigation. Complexity of
evidence, issues, or values was not a reason in itself for finding that
the court was not competent to deal with the claim. 9 8 The court then
applied this analytical framework, finding that the plaintiff's injury
was "severe and isolated" and difficult to justify as a risk of "any"
governmental activity. As to the parole agency's interests, the court
noted that the board was under a statutory duty not to release, unless
(a) there was a "reasonable probability that such prisoner will live
and remain at liberty without violating the law" and (b) the board
was of the opinion that "such release is not incompatible with the
welfare of society." Noting that the decision to release took place at
a fairly low position in the board's hierarchy and noting the above
statutory duties, the court was ready to find that a release in "total
disregard of known propensities for repetitive brutal behaviour is
not simply an abuse of discretion but rather an act completely
outside of the statutory limitations." 99
The board's discretion, said the court, lay in the power to make
rules and guidelines; the application of the guidelines was an
operational matter. On this basis, the court refused to find that the
release and supervision decisions were within the statutory
immunity. 10 0 This reasoning is in line with another American
case,' 0 ' wherein a police officer was slain by a person awaiting trial
but under supervised release as part of a special government
program for the protection and supervision of potential government
witnesses. The wife of the deceased proceeded under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, alleging negligence in the release and supervision
of the wrongdoer and negligence in the failure to warn the local
97. Ibid, at 144-145.
98. Ibid, at 145.
99. Ibid, at 146.
100. Ibid, at 146-47.
101. Bergman v. U.S. (1981) 526 F. Supp. 443 (Dis. Missouri, Bungate J.).
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police of the transfer and location of the government witness to the
area in question or to warn of the witness' known potential for
violence. In rejecting the defendants' claim to statutory immunity
for discretionary actions and decisions, the court stated that, in
selecting the witness for supervised release, the United States
marshals were not formulating policy; "their actions were not
meant to guide the actions of other government officials faced with
similar situations."1 0 2 They were simply applying policy and rules
that were already formulated.
Needless to say, not all American cases follow the Payton
approach. In stark contrast is the decision of the Supreme Court of
California in Thompson. '0 3 In that case, the parents sued the county
for the wrongful death of their five year old son. They alleged that
the county was negligent in releasing an eighteen year old
delinquent into the custody of his mother while knowing that the
delinquent had a record of sexual violence towards young children,
that it had been predicted that he would make an attack on young
children if released, and that the delinquent, prior to release, had
stated that upon release he would kill some child in the
neighbourhood. The delinquent was released to the mother,
although no warning of these threats was given to her; nor were any
warnings given to the neighbourhood parents or to the police. The
defendants claimed the benefit of the California statutory immunity
for actions of a discretionary nature, and the court ruled that the
immunity applied to the decision to release, as well as to the
supervision of the delinquent:
Choosing a proper custodian to direct the attempted rehabilitation
of a minor with a prior history of anti-social behavior is a
complex task . . . . The determination involves a careful
consideration and balancing of such factors as the protection of
the public, the physical and psychological needs of the minor, the
relative suitability of the home environment, the availability of
other resources such as halfway houses and community centers,
and the need to reintegrate the minor into the community. The
decision, requiring as it does, comparisons, choices, judgments,
and evaluations, comprises the very essence of the exercise of
"discretion" and we conclude that such decisions are immunized
under section 820.2.104
102. lbid, at 451.
103. Thompson v. County of Alameda (1980) 614 P. 2d 728 (Calif. Sup. Ct., in

banc).
104. Ibid, at 732.
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It should be noted that the majority's decision does not take the
same carefully analytic approach as was outlined in Payton. Its level
of generality is similar to that of Dorset Yacht, where the decision to
release was also declared to be a matter of discretion.
In Thompson, having failed to establish a duty of care in granting
release, the plaintiffs argued that there was a specific duty of care to
warn that fell outside the sweep of the statutory immunity. The
court rejected this claim also, stating that no duty to warn arose in
the absence of a "special relationship" linking the defendant and
the plaintiffs so as to distinguish the plaintiffs from the general
community. 10 5 The defendants, said the court, did not owe a duty to
the world at large. The court distinguished its own earlier decision
in Tarasoff.10 6 In that case, the court imposed a duty to warn where
a psychotherapist became privy to a death threat uttered by his
patient in the course of a therapy session. Five months later, the
patient killed the victim, as he had threatened to do. The court held
in that case that the injury was foreseeable, the victim had been
specifically identified in the death threat, and a duty to warn arose
upon the special relationship between the client, the therapist, and
the identified victim. In Thompson, the court said, a specific victim
had not been identified beforehand, so no duty arose. The strongly
worded dissent disagreed with this approach, stating that "[o]ur
decision rested upon the basic tenet of tort law that a defendant owes
a duty of care to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his
0 7
conduct."1
From what has been said, it would appear that "duty" is less a
matter of law and more a matter of values, policy, and factors
relating to broad economic and political considerations. The
Thompson court adverts to the broad policy issues, as follows:
It is a fundamental proposition of tort law that one is liable for
injuries caused by a failure to exercise reasonable care. We have
said, however, that in considering the existence of "duty" in a
given case several factors require consideration including the
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that
the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the
moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of
105. lbid, at 734-35.
106. Tarasoff v. The Regents of the University of California(1976) 551 P. 2d 334
(Calif. Sup. Ct., in banc).
107. Thompson, supra, fn. 103 at 739.
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preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant
and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to
exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the
availability cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk
involved. .

.

. When public agencies are involved, additional

elements include the extent of [the agency's] powers, the role
imposed upon it by law and the limitations imposed upon it by
budget. 10 8
Notwithstanding the difficulties inherent in deciding whether a
duty should be imposed, the Thompson approach can only leave the
ordinary person shaking his head in disbelief. What compelling
reasons lead the court to insist that no duty is owed except to a
particular foreseeable victim? Everyone knows that drivers of cars
owe a duty of care to all users of the highway, whether they know
them or not, and manufacturers owe a duty of care to the consumers
of their products. The courts do not require a "special relationship"
beyond foresight that members of a class are likely to be injured.
Where the injury arises out of the actions of public officials in the
exercise of their powers, the courts ought to recognize, as they did
in Payton, "a recognized public duty or individualized special duty
based on the circumstances of the case to protect society from harm
in the execution of policy once it has been formulated."1 0 9 Having
found such a duty, the court in Payton found no reasons arising
from policy which compelled it to exempt the defendants from
liability.
To summarize, "special relationship", "proximate relationship", and other euphemisms reflect the courts' attempts to bridge
the gap between the concept of duty in private tort law and a duty in
negligence imposed on public officials. As both Anns and Payton
show, even once a duty is found, there may be policy reasons for
not holding the defendants liable. In this respect, the approach taken
in Payton suggests a rational and pressing analysis of the interests
and factors involved. One of these factors is the nature of the
plaintiff's injury. Loss of life or limb is a grevious loss of the
highest order, difficult to justify as the risk of any government
activity. Such loss resulting from parole board action is even more
difficult to justify, since the agency is under a statutory obligation to
act consistently with the public welfare and the protection of the
108. Ibid, at 732-33.
109. Payton, supra, fn. 95 at 147-148.

The Parole Board: What Liability to Victims? 563

public. As to the government's interest, pursuance of which results
in injury, attention should be paid to the nature and quality of that
interest, to the nature of the decision-making involved, and to its
adequacy in terms of thoroughness and competence, including
reference to the agency's guidelines or procedures. The nature of
the government's interest may also be assessed in part by noting the
administrative level at which the injurious decisions or action took
place and by determining whether the plaintiff's claim attacks the
agency's policy or merely its application. Fundamental to this
concern is the underlying need to respect separation of powers and
to avoid judicial second-guessing of legislative or top-level
executive decision-making. "10
Earlier in this paper, reference was made to the nature of the
parole process in Canada."' Parole decision-making is structured
by express policy, specific procedures, and specific criteria.
Usually, the decision to release is made at the lowest level of the
hierarchy; even in cases requiring "special votes", the statutory
criteria for release and the nature of risk assessment remain
unchanged. The decision to release does not involve weighty issues
of politics, as in foreign affairs, or a balancing of prosecutorial
resources involved in laying down prosecutorial guidelines. With all
due respect to Lord Diplock, it surely is wrong to say that courts
have no competence to assess administrative decisions in releasing a
prisoner on parole. In committing persons to mental hospitals or on
hearing applications for their release, the court has traditionally
dealt with much the same issues as it faces in parole release. The
standard of competence used in assessing physicians' performances
or those of solicitors or engineers surely provides workable criteria
for making the issues amenable to the judicial process. It seems
unpersuasive to say that a court has no competence to assess
whether or not an official acted reasonably in selecting a given
person for release, given certain information and certain statutory
criteria, when the court will, at the same time, engage in complex
and intangible issues involving medical malpractice, anticombines
practices, human rights violations, and jurisdiction over offshore
resources. In any event, as is suggested below, the Charter demands
110. This concern is reflected throughout Dorset Yacht: the executive and the
legislative functions cannot be taken over by the courts. So, too, in Payton, supra,
fn. 95, 143. See also Hogg, supra, fn. 73.
111. Carriere and Silverstone, supra, fn. 55.
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that the courts get involved in the very assessments of policy from
which Lord Diplock shrank in Dorset Yacht.
VI. The Charter
The reluctance of the common law courts to impose liability in cases
where victims claim damages against public officials is depressing.
The doctrine of ultra vires, "discretionary" powers, and the various
elements of "duty", "special relationship", "proximity", or
"causation" have been used to avoid redress to the victim. Often
the courts' reasoning is not compelling, perhaps because it is
presented in terms of private law litigation concepts, rather than
those of public law liability. The courts, it would appear, have
surrendered too easily in the face of "policy", unwilling to admit
that, whichever way they decide the case, they are involved in
policy issues, whether or not they are acknowledged. Will the
victim then be better off pursuing a remedy under the Charter of
Rights?
At this point, it will be advantageous to analyze the victim's
claim to justice, as such, before inquiring into whether he or she
may have any right to redress under the Charter. Take, as a starting
point, John Rawls' first and second principles of justice. Rawls'
influential work constructs a theory of justice which, though not
free from academic criticism, offers a rights-oriented starting point
for analysis. His approach will not be comforting to those who
believe that utility and the greater happiness principle should be
dispositive of claims made by victims. Rawls rejects bare utility as
the final arbiter of rights, and asserts instead a principle of liberty
and equality. Each person in society, he asserts, has an equal right
to liberty and any inequalities are arbitrary unless they can be shown
to be to everyone's advantage:
First, each person participating in a practice, or affected by it, has
an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with a like
liberty for all; and second, inequalities are arbitrary unless it is
reasonable to expect that they will work out for everyone's
advantage, and provided the positions and offices to which they
attach, or from which they may be gained, are open to all. These
principles express justice as a complex of three ideas: liberty,
equality, and reward for services contributing to the common

good. 112
112. John Rawls, "Justice as Fairness", in J. Feinberg and H. Gross, eds., Justice
(Encino, Calif.: Dickenson Publishing, 1977) 101-15, at 102.
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The victim's claim is that a government practice of releasing
prisoners before expiration of sentence increases the level of risk
during any given period of time, a risk that materializes and falls not
upon society as a whole, but upon the individual victim.
For the victim, the costs of government parole practices
grievously exceed the intended benefits. On this basis, Rawls'
second principle has not been met and parole practices must be
regarded as the infliction of an arbitrary inequality. To test this
conclusion, Rawls would have us imagine rational men sitting
around together and planning the rules and practices with which to
run a cooperative venture of mutual benefit. In considering a
proposed parole program as part of that venture, the risk of the
parolee assaulting some individual while on release must be taken
into account, along with the benefits to the community as a whole.
Would those imagined rational men shrug off the potential harm to
victims as an inevitable consequence of the parole program - that
is, as a consequence which raised no real questions of justice? Or
would rational men in such circumstances be driven to the
conclusion that the proposed parole practice, lacking in demonstrable benefits, was inherently unjust, especially as the burden of loss
would fall unequally on a few victims and would prejudice their
equal right to life, liberty, and security of person? Rawls insists that
acceptance of an inequality is allowable "only if there is reason to
believe that the practice with the inequality, or resulting in it, will
work for the advantage of every party engaging in it." ' "l 3
Furthermore, Rawls suggests that a government program or practice
is itself arbitrary and suspect where it creates a disadvantage or
increased burden for the least advantaged class in society, even
though it purports to bring a benefit to society as a whole. A parole
release policy or program, in casting an inevitable disadvantage
onto victims, would therefore be unjust.
Does the Charter of Rights provide any scope for redress to
victims of such an injustice? Does the Charter invite the courts to
look behind the "discretionary" shield that has given government
officials immunity in other contexts? Section 7 of the Charter
guarantees the right to life, liberty, and security of the person, as
follows: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice." This provision must be
113. Ibid.
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read in the light of the guarantee provided in section 7 and the
preceding preamble: "Whereas Canada is founded upon principles
that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of Law . . . The
CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society." Where the right to life or security has been
unlawfully denied or abrogated, the Charter permits an applicant to
seek a remedy in the court under Section 24( 1),114 which states that
"[a]nyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter,
have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent
jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate
and just in the circumstances." It should be noted that the Charter
applies as against governments and public officials, not against
private individuals. Accordingly, a victim of a crime committed by
a person on a conditional release from prison would have to apply
the Charter provisions against the actions of the correctional service
involved.
The rights to life, liberty, and security of person, set out in
section 7 of the Charter, do not carry an absolute guarantee. This is
apparent from the limiting words of section 7 itself, which read,
''except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice",
and from the limiting words in section 1, which read, "subject only
to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society." It is not absolutely clear
whether the effect of these two limitations is to erect two hurdles in
the path of the victim alleging a constitutional infringement or
whether the limitations are to be read as alternative hurdles, so that
proof of violation of one or another of the sections would be
sufficient. Common sense and logic suggest that proof of a violation
of section 7, namely, that the government action is in violation of
the principles of "fundamental justice", necessarily entails an
infringement under section 1, in that an action which is a violation
of "fundamental justice" could hardly be "reasonable"
or
"demonstrably justified". It should be noted that, under either
section 7 or section 1, the onus of proving a valid limitation would
likely fall upon the party attempting to seek its protection, namely,
1 15
the government agency.
114. S. 52(1) of the Constitution Act should also be kept in mind.
115. As of the time of writing, there are relatively few significant cases decided
under the Charter.
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Rawls' notion of justice will now be helpful in understanding the
scope of the limiting words of section 7 of the Charter. As
indicated, the rights to life, liberty, and personal security set out in
that section are not absolute, but may be limited "in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice." This limiting phrase, to
begin with, is capable of sustaining various meanings. It can be
said, first, to carry a guarantee of procedural fairness. But second, it
can be said to import the standard of an equal right to liberty - that
is to say, a standard of fairness governing the equal distribution of
burdens and benefits as allocated through law in accordance with
Rawls' first principle.
Some hint as to the meaning of the phrase "fundamental justice"
may be gained by examining its appearance in other contexts, for
example, in section 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, as follows:
Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an
Act of the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate
notwithstanding the CanadianBill of Rights, be so construed and
applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe or to authorize the
abrogation, abridgement or infringement of any of the rights or
freedoms herein recognized and declared, and in particular, no
law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as
to ...(e) deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in

accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the
determination of his rights and obligations.
As it appears in that section, the phrase "fundamental justice" was
commented on, as follows, by Fauteaux J., speaking for the Supreme
Court of Canada in Duke v. The Queen: "Without attempting to
formulate any final definition of those words, I would take them to
mean, generally, that the tribunal which adjudicates upon his rights
must act fairly, in good faith, without bias and in a judicial temper,
11 6
and must give him the opportunity to adequately state his case."
As a minimum, therefore, it seems beyond question that a
requirement of procedural fairness is imported by the limiting words
of section 7 and that the scope of such fairness includes at least the
requirements of the rules of natural justice so familiar to established
law. As can be seen in the Canadian Bill of Rights, the phrase
"fundamental justice" is coloured by its context, namely, a
requirement that a right may not be abridged without a hearing in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. In this
context, there is a temptation to limit the phrase to "fundamental
116. Duke v. The Queen (1972) 18 C.R.N.S. 302 (S.C.C.).
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fairness", a phrase that has received considerable judicial
elaboration, in recent years, within the context of procedural
fairness.
Under section 7 of the Charter, however, it would be incongruous
to limit "fundamental justice" to a procedural fairness standard, for
section 7 is not concerned only with tribunals and hearings, but with
any limitation of the rights to life, liberty, and personal security,
whether such limitation be imposed by a tribunal, by an official
acting in the course of his duties, or by other governmental action.
Logically, and as a matter of justice, section 7 applies to statutory
enactments, executive regulations, and government policies and
programs. It would be shocking if section 7 were to be read by the
courts as permitting, for example, legislative or executive orders
depriving Jewish Canadians of their liberty for two weeks each year
or permitting arbitrary police searches of all residents, in say,
Crocus, Saskatchewan. To limit "fundamental justice" to procedural fairness only would be tantamount to giving judicial
blessing to arbitrary treatment, or even persecution, of minorities;
yet it was just such unfairness that the Charter was enacted to
prevent. While it may be argued that these specific examples are
already covered by specific sections of the Charter, such as ss. 8 and
2, respectively, it is not compelling to argue that section 7 has no
enduring force in its own right but is swallowed up in other specific
sections of the Charter. The words of Parliament in section 7 must
be given meaning, and those very words, namely, "fundamental
justice", permit and suggest a substantive fairness requirement
where life, liberty, and personal security are imperilled by
government action. 117
As outlined above, Rawls' two principles of justice suggest a
starting point for the consideration of substantive fairness. A
justification must always be required for a departure from the
original position of equal liberty. Such a justification can be made in
accordance with Rawls' second principle, namely, that there is
reason to believe that a given practice, with its resulting inequality,
will work for the advantage of every person engaging in it, so that
117. Contra, Hogg, Peter, Canada Act, 1982, Annotated (Toronto: Carswell
(student ed.), 1982) at 27; see also McDonald, David, Legal Rights in the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1982) 17, 24.

However, the British Columbia Court of Appeal, in Reference Re s. 94(2) of the
Motor Vehicle Act (Feb. 3/83), states that section 7 does not confer a power of
substantive review.

The Parole Board: What Liability to Victims? 569

even the person who is disadvantaged by the practice would prefer
to maintain it, considering the overall benefit conferred by it. 118
This second principle does not permit the exploitation of a
minority for the benefit of the majority, a position well-taken, not
only by Rawls, but by the utilitarian, David Hume. 119 Thus, it is
apparent that the Charter raises an external standard against which
official action must be judged wherever fundamental rights are
infringed. The Charter suggests a standard of "fundamental
justice". From a Rawlsian viewpoint, as we have noted, justice is
premised on an imperative of equal liberty. It connotes, as well, a
system of law governed by the rule of law, in the sense that laws
must be assumed to be enacted for the purpose of enhancing or
protecting liberty. It follows that the risks associated with a parole
release program would not be justifiable merely on economic or
humanitarian grounds, but only as a means of ensuring basic equal
liberty for the representative citizen.
Government programs or actions that appear to throw disproportionate risk or loss upon a minority - for example, the victims of a
parole release policy - would not be in accordance with principles
of fundamental justice unless, as in the case of conscription, the
120
burden can be seen as a fair way of sharing a national burden.
Conscription is generally believed to be a rational response to a
valid state objective, namely, national defence, and although the
risks associated with the program may fall calamitously upon
specific individuals, there appears to be no known way of
eliminating such loss entirely. In the pursuit of liberty, conscription
may be the lesser of two evils. Thus, it could not be said that the
burden of the program falls unequally on members of a class in
violation of Rawls' second principle of justice unless the
conscription program was so badly conceived and executed that its
burdens were not evenly shared by all members of society or it
suffered from class bias in its call-up procedures.
The requirements of fundamental justice in a society under rule of
law demand not only that government action meet the imperative of
equal liberty; they demand as a corollary that state law be rationally
designed to guide rational men and women in the pursuit of liberty.
118. Rawls, John,A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1971).
119. Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. II, Pt. I., A.D. Lindsay, ed.

(London: Everymans Library, Dent, 1966), vol. 2, 202.
120. Rawls, supra, fn. 112 at 379-382.
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However, parole release programs, unlike national defence
programs, are no longer perceived as being causally connected to
the enhancement of liberty. As was indicated earlier, there is no
evidence to show that parole release reduces recidivism. Parole
release, unlike conscription, does not meet the justice and rule of
law requirements that legal rules be rationally related to ends
capable of being achieved by rational men. 121
The linkage in the Charter of principles of fundamental justice
and the rule of law forces the common law lawyer to look again at
the context of the rule of law. There can be no doubt that the rule of
law provides an external standard of procedural fairness. What has
been sometimes overlooked is its implicit standard of fairness with
respect to substantive law. The rule of law is implanted in the
Canadian Constitution not only through the Charter, but through the
preamble to the Constitutional Act, which states that Canada is to
have a constitution "similar in principle to that of the United
Kingdom." Professor Dicey, in his classic statement about the rule
122
of law, identified its three constituent elements, as follows:
(1) The supremacy of regular law as opposed to the influence of
arbitrary power, excluding the existence of arbitrariness,
prerogative, or even wide discretionary authority on the part of
the government;
(2) Equality before the law, excluding the idea of any exemption
of officials or others from the duty of obedience to the law which
governs other citizens;
(3) The law of the Constitution is not the source but the
consequence of the rights of individuals as defined and enforced
by the courts.
With the passage of time, Dicey's analysis must be read in the light
of changed conditions; the modern import of Dicey's statement is
captured by Professor H.W. Jones, writing in the Columbia Law
23
Review:1
(1) In a decent society it is unthinkable that government, or any
officer of government, possesses arbitrary power over the person
or interests of the individual;
121. Ibid, at 236-237.
122. Dicey, A.V. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th

ed., London: MacMillan, 1959) at 202-203.
123. Jones, H.W., "The Rule of Law and the Welfare State", in Essays on
Jurisprudencefrom the Columbia Law Review (N.Y.: Columbia University Press,
1963) 400-414, at 406-407.
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(2) All members of society, private persons and government
officials alike, must be equally responsible before the law; and
(3) Effective judicial remedies are more important than abstract
constitutional declarations in securing the rights of the individual
against encroachment by the state.
Dicey's protest against arbitrary power was asserted in the face of a
trend towards executive agencies acting with ill-defined powers and
procedures. There is in this concern a protest against illegality of all
forms, although Dicey had in mind, no doubt, discretionary power
and the need for what today we call procedural fairness. Yet, the
ideal of the rule of law in a just society cannot turn a blind eye to
arbitrary power, whether it be found in procedural or substantive
law. Governments are, in either case, judged by this external
standard. Further light was thrown on the content of the rule of law
by Professor C. J. Hamson, in his identification of the independence
of the judiciary as an aspect of the rule of law. He linked the rule of
law with the principle of legality and its insistence on certainty of
law, public trials, a precise charge, and redress against the state for
24
wrongs committed. 1
H. Malcolm MacDonald, writing in an American context, states
that the absence of arbitrariness is the essence of the rule of law. He
identifies the separation of powers as an important element of the
rule of law and judicial review as a means of securing fundamental
freedoms. "Equal protection of laws," he writes, "is an important
standard through which rule of law prevails." In addition, he goes
on to identify various procedural protections associated with the rule
of law. 125
The International Commission of Jurists has made an important
contribution to the rule of law in the post-World War II world. Their
reports identify the rule of law as aiming at the protection of the
dignity of the individual through the articulation of human and
procedural rights. The reports state that "[t]he function of the

legislature in a free society under the Rule of Law is to create and
maintain the conditions which will uphold the dignity of man as an
individual.' 1 26 This entails, among other things, that a legislature
124. Hamson, CA., "The Essence of Law", in Report of the International
Commission of Jurists, The Hague, 1956, 25-27.

125. MacDonald, Malcolm H., "Government Under Law", in A.H. Harding,
ed., The Rule of Law (Dallas: Southern Methodist U. Press, 1961) 3-21 at 6-7.
126. The Rule of Law and Human Rights: Principles and Definitions (Geneva:

International Commission of Jurists, 1966) at 9.
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must observe limitations on its power and, in particular, the
legislature must, according to the commission, "not impair the
exercise of fundamental rights and freedom of the individual," and
it must "provide procedural machinery and safeguards whereby the
2 7
above-mentioned freedoms are given effect and protected." 1
In speaking of a country under the rule of law where fundamental
freedoms are protected by principles of fundamental justice, it is
surely to those substantive issues that the Charter directs our minds,
not merely to procedural regularity. Enacted law is subject to a
substantive review in order to ensure that fundamental freedoms are
not abrogated arbitrarily, but only in accordance with rational law,
and that they are regularly enacted and rationally justifiable in the
name of equal liberty. The rule of law, as articulated by the
International Commission of Jurists in their report of 1955, calls
upon the state to abide by the principles of fundamental justice and
specifically demands that the state be subject to law, for men are to
be ruled by law and not simply by the will of those in power.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to
which Canada and the provinces adhered, reflects these aspirations
of the rule of law. The covenant articulates, as follows, human
rights that cannot be abridged without a properly constituted review
of such abrogation:
PREAMBLE
The States Parties to the present Covenant!,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in
the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace
in the world.
Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity
of the human person, Recognizing that, in accordance with the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human
beings enjoying civil and political freedom from fear and want
can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone
may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic,
social and cultural rights.
Considering the obligation of States under the Charter of the
United Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance
of, human rights and freedoms.
Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals
127. Ibid, at 10.
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and to the community to which he belongs, is under a
responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the
rights recognized in the present Covent,
Agree upon the following articles...
PART II
Article 2
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to
its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth, or other status.
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other
measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to
take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional
processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to
adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to
give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as
herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy,
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons
acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall
have his right thereto determined by competent judicial,
administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other
competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State,
and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such
remedies when granted...
Article 6
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This life
shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his life.
Article 9
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person . ...
No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds
and in accordance with such procedures as are established by
law. 128
128. United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as
reproduced in Leech, N.E. et al, DocumentarySupplement to Cases and Materials

574 The Dalhousie Law Journal

It would appear, then, that the rule of law, as the International
Commission of Jurists stated, springs from the rights of individuals
as developed in the age-old struggle for freedom. The rule itself,
says the commission, is consistent with "fundamental principles of
justice' 129 and includes not only rules of natural justice and
fundamental fairness, as specified in case law and the Canadian Bill
of Rights, for example, but also guarantees against arbitrary law or
other abrogation of fundamental rights without check or review.
It would seem, then, that Parole Board decisions respecting
releases and supervision are subject to a Charter review to ensure
that they are not arbitrary. At a minimum, therefore, the courts must
ignore the discretionary veil at this level of decision-making, and
must critically assess professional competence, the standards and
procedures used in collecting and assessing information, and, in
particular, must assess and interpret the agency's competence in the
determination of undue risk. At a minimum within the context of
parole decision-making, the rule of law suggests a rational
assessment of risk. It should be noted that the Parole Act does not
specify what type of risk is to be considered, yet specificity as to the
type of risk is essential in order to avoid gross error in the
assessment. As indicated earlier, predictions as to risks of violence
are, in general, fraught with error, but the error can be reduced by
taking account of "base rates", that is, the proportion of people in a
given population and during a specified period of time who are
known, for example, to commit acts of violence. Base rates have
been developed in the health and insurance industries, as well as in
others; there is no good reason why they should not be employed by
parole boards. As suggested above, specific content must be given
to the statutory criterion of undue risk. Does it mean risk to persons,
does it include risk to property, or does it simply apply to
disturbances of public peace or, perhaps, state security? Does the
prediction mean a mere possibility of risk or does it mandate a
likelihood of risk, say, at least a fifty-fifty chance? Over what
period of time is the prediction based? Unless the agency has
specific criteria and guidelines in relation to these matters, each
decision-maker will be free to make his or her own conscious or
unconscious assessment on differing criteria; in short, the
on the InternationalLegal System (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1973) 46-62;

63-66.
129. Act of Athens, June 1955, in The Rule of Law in a Free Society, International
Commission of Jurists, 1959.
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decision-making becomes arbitrary, not rational or principled.
Fairness and the rule of law, being concerned that decision-makers
address the issues before them, require explicit formulation of
the questions to be answered, advertence to essential and available
knowledge in order to answer the questions, and exclusion of
irrelevant or extraneous considerations. The United States Court of
Appeals expressed some of these concerns in Millard v. Harris, as
follows:

130

Predictions of dangerousness . . . require determinations of
several sorts: the type of conduct in which the individual may
engage; the likelihood or probability that he will in fact engage in
that conduct; and the effect such conduct if engaged in will have
on others. Depending on the sort of conduct and effect feared,
these variables may also require further refinement.
Were a parolee released in the absence of such careful
assessment, conducted in accordance with such standards, how can
it be said that the risks were unavoidable and that release was simply
the lesser of two evils? Where agency decisions work a manifest
injustice and where the unreliability of the agency decision-making
renders it arbitrary, rather than principled and rational, it is difficult
to see how such executive processes, carrying as they do such
dramatic potential for cutting short individual rights of the highest
order, can be consistent with the aspirations implicit in the rule of
law or the "principles of fundamental justice" set out in section 7 of
the Charter. In a democratic society, such as that envisaged by the
International Commission of Jurists and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, the legislature and the executive are
bound to jealously guard the individual's right to life and not subject
it to the vagaries of social experiment.
Considerations of substantive fairness, as Rawls suggests,
inevitably compel the conclusion that it is manifestly unjust to barter
away an individual's claim to equal protection and equal benefit of
the law in the name of an elusive overall public benefit. Given the
above premises, the victim of a crime of violence committed by a
person released on parole would be expected to allege a substantive
violation of constitutionally protected rights under section 7 of the
Charter. Such an assertion may be regarded by some people as rank
heresay, since it has been rumoured in the dovecotes that the courts
130. Millard v. Harris (1968) 406 F. 2d 964 at 973 (U.S. Court of Appeals, Dis.
Col. Cir.).
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will never permit a substantive review of the legislation for violation
of Charter rights. It is said that section 7 is confined to a procedural
fairness review. It is said that the departmental drafters of the
Charter deliberately omitted the phrase "due process" from section
7 in order to preclude the courts from engaging in a judicial review
of the substance of the impugned legislative or of executive action.
Instead, the phrase "except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice" was used, in the hope of constraining judicial
review to matters of procedure only. Whether the purported aims of
the drafters will be met, only time can tell, but it is certain that a
plain reading of section 7 does mandate a judicial review of
governmental action which threatens or places in jeopardy an
individual's right to life, liberty, or security of the person.
Indeed, there is no particular magic in the phrase "due process",
for it is but a "summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for
those personal immunities which, as Mr. Justice Cardozo said, are
'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked fundamental'." 1 3 1 This view would seem to be consistent
with the purpose of the Charter, for it would be a mockery of
Canada's ideals and her obligations under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and a violation of the
concept of the rule of law itself, to say that legislative or executive
action may practise the most vile deprivations of rights, yet the only
recourse is the ballot box. It would be incongruous for the courts to
turn a blind eye to torture, gross human indecencies, and practices
akin to the rack and the screw, blinking only if authorization be not
duly enacted or objecting only should there be some procedural
3 2
irregularity. 1
While space does not permit a detailed review of how the courts
in the United States have approached substantive review, one or two
points of departure may be identified. The courts there have taken
the moderate position that they will not rush to undertake a
substantive review; they will not review unless the impugned state
action runs afoul of a specific constitutional provision affecting
fundamental rights. Where a fundamental right, such as the right to
life and liberty, is at issue, the courts have required the government
to show that the impugned law is necessary to promote a compelling
131. Rochin v. California (1952) 342 U.S. 165; 73 S. Ct. 205; 96 L. Ed. 183, at
188, per Frankfurter J.
132. See Reference Re s. 96(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, supra, fn. 117.
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or overriding state interest. Where no "fundamental" right is at
stake, the courts merely require that the impugned law relate to a
legitimate end of government; in these cases, as long as there is
some basis for finding such a rational relationship, the courts will
not intervene. The minimal standard in cases affecting lower order
33
rights appears to be "total arbitrary deprivation of liberty". 1
Prime facie, proof of breach of a constitutionally protected claim
should establish a right to a remedy, for rights without remedies are
nullities. The International Commission of Jurists asserts that, in a
free and democratic society, the rule of law requires that citizens
ought to have a right of redress against the state for violations of
fundamental rights. The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, to which Canada and the provinces are signatories,
as well as to Optional Protocal, 134 states that a violation of
Covenant rights imposes an obligation on the state to provide a
remedy. 135 Moreover, in ordinary thinking and, indeed, in the
tradition of legal rationality, compensation is the surrogate of the
individual's right: it flows as a matter of course from Rawls' first
principle of justice. The Charter itself, in s. 24(1), states that a
violation of a Charter right entitles the individual whose right was
violated to apply to the court for a remedy. However, the Charter
leaves it within the discretion of the court to provide a remedy and,
if so, what type.
Once a deprivation of a guaranteed liberty has been found, based
either on a lack of rationality in the statute or in the
decision-making, or on a failure to meet professional work
standards, the liability of public officials should follow as a matter
of course from the "deep sense of common law morality that one

133. Roe v. Wade (1973) 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147; Tribe,
Laurence H., American Constitutional Law (Mineola N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1978) c. 1.
134. Canada and the provinces adhered to the Charter on the 19th of May, 1976,
effective as of the 19th of August, 1976: Ryan, H.R.S., Seeking Relief Under the
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1981), 6
Queen's Law Jo., 389-407, at 390. Limitations of time and space do not permit a
perusal of the question of to what extent the Canadian courts are likely to integrate
the provisions of the convenant with domestic Canadian law.
135. The Covenant, Pt. II, Art. 3, supra, fn. 120. While the Protocol provides for
a procedure for hearing a complaint, there is no provision for having any remedy
enforced.
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who hurts another should compensate him".' 3 6 This is particularly
so in an age where the potential for harmful governmental action is
on the increase. It is unfair that an exercise of governmental powers,
having been found to be unjustifiable and unconstitutional, should
nevertheless escape accountability. Excuses such as good faith, due
care, honest ignorance, and the like should not be used as swords to
defeat the victim's claim for loss. Where the defendant creates
rationally unjustifiable risks which result in harm to the plaintiff, the
defendant should prima facie be held liable. This resort to strict
liability for the breach of fundamental rights does not mean that the
defendant is to be held for all and every loss flowing from his
wrongful act, for losses are limited by a valid theory of causation.
So, too, it would be a defence to a prima facie case if the plaintiff
voluntarily agreed to run the risk of the injury. 137 Whether the
courts adopt strict liability as the basis for responsibility, based as it
is on notions of corrective justice, or whether they fall back upon
that more familiar but wretchedly unsatisfactory product of utility,
namely, negligence, it should be manifestly clear that the plaintiff
should not be left to bear alone the risk of governmental action, a
risk that materializes in a crushing burden on his shoulders alone.
Even utility demands that governmental operations be accountable
and bear the inevitable costs of their operations.
If the strict liability approach is applied to the case of Toews, for
example, then recovery should not be denied unless it can be shown
that the plaintiff took upon herself the risk of the harm, that is, that
she assumed the risk or inflicted it on herself. Did Ms. Toews
unilaterally, voluntarily, consciously, and deliberately decide to run
the risk of becoming a paraplegic? The answer should not turn upon
the application of a reasonable man test, for "[t]he prudence of the
plaintiff's decision to assume the risk is his own affair, not that of
the courts."1 3 8 Nor should compulsion, in the context of Toews, be
rejected by the court as a counter-argument to voluntary assumption
of risk.' 3 9 Moreover, it would be ludicrous to assert that Ms. Toews
had agreed to run the risk of harm by a parolee simply by virtue of
136. Green, Leon, Foreseeability in Negligence Law (1961) 61 Col L. Rev.
1401-1424 at 1412.
137. Epstein, supra, fn. 81, 34-47, and chapters 6 and 7. By analogy to trespass,
private necessity, reasonable care, cost, and compulsion would not be defences in a
prima facie case: see 44-47.

138. Ibid, at 101-03; 105-06.
139. lbid, at 105-06.
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being a citizen in a democratic country that enacted legislation
making such risks possible. There also is not substantial merit to the
objection that the plaintiff should not recover because that would
give her an advantage over victims of crime generally. Lord
Diplock was troubled by this apparent inequality and stated that
injuries arising from crime were one of the ordinary risks of social
living. 1 40 And so they are. Yet the minute the government sets in
motion machinery to release persons who would otherwise be
detained, the government's volitional act 1 4 1 constitutes a key
element that distinguishes this type of case from the ordinary case.
Equally irrelevant is the consideration of whether the plaintiff's
claim should be defeated because there are alternative means of
compensation available, such as the current schemes permitting
compension to victims of crime, upon application, and in certain
instances. Victim compensation schemes of the type currently in
operation are not responsive to the victims' legal right and claim to
corrective justice. Crime compensation schemes appear not to be
based on victim or individual rights at all, but on public
beneficence: charity for the unfortunate. For this reason, perhaps,
they are not advertised, and compensation may be made only upon
application. To deny a valid legal claim on the basis that the
plaintiff can apply for charity is ludicrous. As indicated above, the
victim of an injury inflicted by a person on early release from prison
has a right, grounded in corrective justice, to compensation. To
deny his right and force the plaintiff to apply for a handout in such
circumstances is to belittle the importance of the right that is
violated.
Nor should applicants for a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter,
having established an unjustifiable deprivation, be hampered by
arguments from the defendant that to allow a remedy would
jeopardize or have an inhibiting effect upon the willingness of
government officials to make decisions, thus undermining the
agency's mandate. Lord Morris was particularly sensitive to this
issue 1 42 in Dorset Yacht, but Lord Reid1 4 3 was sceptical, saying
''my experience leads me to believe that Her Majesty's servants are
made of sterner stuff." Various other courts have considered what
140. Dorset Yacht, supra, fn. 77 at 333-34.
141. Epstein, supra, fn. 81 at 22-23.
142. Dorset Yacht, supra, fn. 77 at 309.

143. Ibid, at 302.
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weight should be attached to such an alleged inhibiting effect on the
robust discharge of public duties. In Payton, the court noted, in
considering whether liability would unduly inhibit officials in the
exercise of discretion, that the financial burden fell upon the
government and not the individual officers, and concluded that
potential liability would not have a significant inhibiting effect on
the exercise of discretion. 144 Nor did the court feel that the financial
burden on the government in the case of damages in actions against
the Parole Board would prove to be embarrassing or even
significant.
Finally, it may be anticipated that, in attempting to thwart an
award of damages under s. 24(1), the defendant may once again
raise the issue of immunity, presumably on some theory of
separation of powers or discretionary action. For the reasons given
earlier, it is suggested that the argument is misplaced with respect to
parole release and supervision. In Canada and England, only judges
and legislators have been given an immunity by the courts, yet even
in the case of judges, it is not absolute.' 45 Certain qualified
statutory immunities, such as those conferred upon peace officers
under the Criminal Code, 146 or under various provincial Corrections
Acts 147 or other statutes,' 48 must be read in light of the guarantees
in the Charter. It is ridiculous to suggest that stupidity or
incompetence are such an integral part of the principles of
fundamental justice as to defeat a victim's otherwise justifiable
claim to damages. In short, the old common law statutory immunity
may not be a barrier to a victim's Charter claim.
If the victim is to avoid the above-mentioned perils, courts must
develop a workable theory of the liability of public officials. To
date, such attempts, as witnessed above, have been virtually
hamstrung by private law concerns. Now, however, the Charter
provides an opportunity for the courts to develop a simple duty to
administer the law competently. Whether claims are pressed
forward independently of the Charter or not, proof of failure to meet

144. Payton, supra, fn. 95 at 148.
145. Sirros v. Moore, [1974] 3 All E.R. 776 (C.A.), holding that a judge has a

limited immunity. He cannot be held liable in damages for errors made in good
faith and while acting judicially.
146. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. 34, s. 450(3) as amended, for example.

147. Correction Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 70, s. 23, for example.
148. Goldenberg, supra, fn. 3.

The Parole Board: What Liability to Victims? 581

simple, ordinary standards of competence should give rise to
liability.
Courts in non-common law jurisdictions have made more
progress in developing a theory of the liability of public officials
than have courts in Anglo-Canadian jurisdictions. In France, the
courts hold government agents to a duty to administer the law
competently. 14 9 The rule does not result in government liability for
all damages flowing from the breach, for liability is limited by a
secondary rule of causal connection, somewhat akin to the common
law concept of "remoteness". This duty of competence may, in
fact, be too restrictive an approach in cases where a governmental
action gives rise to an abnormal risk. In such cases, the court should
impose a duty to see that the risk does not fall disproportionately on
any particular part of the population. Breach of the duty in such
cases, even in the absence of carelessness, should give rise to
compensation for the affected individual. The common law rule in
Bylands v. Fletcher'50 is, in part, responsive to this concern, but it
is restricted to compensating persons injured through the
defendant's abnormal use of land. The Bylands rule has not been
given a wide application by the courts, having been largely confined
to actions against private occupiers of land who make an "unusual"
use of the land by bringing on to it substances which would be of a
potentially dangerous nature should they escape from the land,
Although the rule has not been free of difficulty in application, it
would seem clear that the release of prisoners from a prison does not
fit neatly into the common law concept of unusual use of land.
Other illustrations of the prevalence of strict liability as a basis of
recovery at common law can be found in trespass and products
liability. More fruitful for present purposes, however, is the
formulation, by the American Restatement of Torts, of recovery
without regard to negligence where individuals suffer loss as a
consequence of the defendant's dangerous actions.' 5 ' The restatement, premised on the assumption of strict liability where the
activity carried on is abnormally risky, provides several criteria for
assessing liability, including: (1) the high degree of risk of harm,
(2) the likelihood that the harm will be great, (3) the feasibility of
149. Harlow, supra, fn. 3.
150. (1868) L.R. 3H.L. 330.
151. American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Torts (St. Paul, Minn.,

1975) p. 519 and Comment.
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eliminating the risk through the exercise of reasonable care, (4) the
extent to which the activity is a matter of common usage, (5) the
inappropriateness of the activity to its surroundings, and (6) the
value of the activity to the community, relative to its inherent
danger. While not all of these criteria appear relevant to
governmental activity, particularly the fourth factor, these criteria
and the concept of strict liability do offer an historical connection
between current law and legal traditions, and the social imperative
for a theory of liability of public officials, through s. 24(1) of the
Charter or otherwise. Factors one to three of the restatement, when
read against the earlier empirical research on parole, suggest that
parole board activities clearly meet the restatement's requirements
of serious risk with little feasibility of controlling or reducing the
risk. Moreover, parole release is not a matter of "common usage",
and offers only problematic benefits to the community as a whole.
Parole release would seem to be a case where, in the words of
Prosser, it is a question of allocating a more or less inevitable loss in
a complex and dangerous civilization to the party best able to
52
shoulder the cost. '
Fletcher, arguing in favor of greater use of strict liability, states
that it is more responsive to claims made by individuals for
corrective justice than negligence is, for it does not presume to
barter away the victim's injury in the name of a greater public
good. 153 The relevant inquiry is not "Is the public agency at
fault?", but "Has the activity (however laudable and wellconducted) caused an improper or disproportionate burden to fall
upon that individual?" Under s. 24(1) of the Charter, it is suggested
that proof of a violation of the Charter is proof of fault, if fault be
needed, and no higher standard should be raised to bar redress. The
search under the Charter should not be directed towards the question
"Was the government agency negligent?", but towards the
question "What socially fair standard meets the costs of providing a
government service which is presumed to be of benefit to all, but
which inevitably imposes grievous burdens on a few?" Where the
presumption of benefit is not made out, as in parole, the court

152. Prosser, W.L., Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West

Publishing, 1971) section 75 at 495.
153. Fletcher, George P., Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory (1972) 85 H.L.R.
537.
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should consider other remedies as well, such as declaring the statute
void. 154
There is increasing recognition of the need for greater public
accountability in the area of individual rights. It would be
unfortunate were the courts, given the opportunity of a fresh start, to
return to the thorny thickets of common law negligence, complete
with "outrageous claims"'1 55 to official immunity. If justice is to be
done at the end of the day, the court must seriously consider strict
liability as the basis of compensation
for victims whose consti6
tutional rights have been violated. 15
VII. Conclusion
While the emphasis in this paper has been on damages as an
appropriate remedy on a s. 24(1) application, it can be assumed that
equitable remedies, such as injunction or declaration, may also be
available. It is worth noting, while not developing them, other
possible remedies against the Parole Board or other government
agencies under s. 24(1). Prospective rulings may be in order, as,
for example, threatening an injunction or other restriction of agency
operations, unless there is a timely reform of procedures or
decision-making processes; trusteeship orders are not inconceiva157
ble, nor even is judicial abolition of obsolescent statutes.
As outlined earlier, there is evidence to show that the Parole Act
is lacking an essential element of rational law in a just society: its
objectives are incapable of being achieved and, thus, its directions
to agency officials are essentially non-rational and arbitrary. It
follows that decisions of agency officials, not having the means to
assess "undue risk" and reduced to making decisions that turn out
to be no better than chance, act arbitrarily. No doubt governments
must experiment, to some extent, in coping with complex
economic, social, and political problems. It is not acceptable in a
free and democratic society, however, for the government to
154. Constitution Act, s. 51(2).
155. See Hamson C.J., Escaping Borstal Boys and Immunity of Office (1969)
Camb. Law Jo. 2 73-83.
156. Schoenholz, Kenneth, Holding Governments Strictly Liable for the Release
of Dangerous Parolees (1980) 55 N.Y.U.I. Rev. 907-40; Craig, supra, fn. 3;
Gould supra, fn. 3.
157. Calabresi, G., A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (Cambridge, Mass.:

Bar. U. Press, 1982). He suggests that the courts have a role to play in saving the
beleaguered citizen from a plethora of obsolescent and "uncommonly silly" laws.
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introduce social programs that, in effect, gamble with citizens'
lives. When faced with that type of legislation, the court should
exercise its powers under section 7 of the Charter to find that the
statute lacks rationality and infringes upon the concept of the rule of
law and upon principles of fundamental justice, as outlined earlier.
In such cases, the court, under s. 24 of the Charter and s. 51(2) of
the Constitution Act, should either declare the statute void, in whole
or in part, or give notice that it will do so within a reasonable period
of time unless the legislature corrects the deficiency. In a day when
the parliamentary process can hardly be said to be responsive to
calls for legislative reform at the behest of individual citizens, this
court power of review may prove to be a salutary means of restoring
public confidence in democratic institutions. If an agency cannot
meet standards of competent administration, as evidenced by a
finding of a violation of a constitutional right, the agency should not
only be liable in damages, but it should also be subject to a
prospective "sunset order" of such a nature that the agency would
be required either to set its house in order or to close up shop.
To summarize, it is suggested that the common law has not been
responsive to victims' claims against prison and parole officials.
This stems, in part, from the courts working from private law
concepts of negligence, including duty, reasonable care, and
proximity. Moreover, the courts have continued to extend an
immunity to public officials, even in the face of proven negligence,
on some perceived need to protect the public service from the
unnerving threat of lawsuits. It is suggested that the courts have not
been sufficiently attuned to the victims' claims to justice and that,
under the Charter, the courts have an opportunity to develop for
Canadians a workable theory of public liability, freed from the
perils of common law negligence. The Charter requires, it is
suggested, not only a traditional judicial review to ensure
procedural fairness in protection of fundamental rights, but a
substantive review to ensure that legislative or executive action
meets the test of the rule of law and fundamental justice. Arbitrary
rules - rules that set out irrational mandates, in the sense that
rational men could not reasonably adapt their behaviour to meet the
mandate - are not in accord with the rule of law and principles of
fundamental justice. Such rules, which threaten fundamental rights,
should be found void, and citizens whose fundamental rights are
abridged by the operation of such rules should have a claim to
compensation under the Charter.

Hugh M. Kindred*

From Hague to Hamburg:
International Regulation of
The Carriage of Goods by Sea

I. Introduction
International adoption of the Hague Rules marked the onset of a
new era in sea carriage law. Prior to that event, national regulation
was the order of the day. Ever since the adoption of those rules,
however, international trade has been subject to a more or less
uniform regime of carriage by sea. The Hague Rules were brought
into being by the Brussels Convention' in 1924 and remained
unchanged until modified by the Visby protocol 2 in 1968. Even as
these amendments were being made, a fresh movement for a wholly
new set of international rules was gathering force. It produced the
Hamburg Rules 3 of 1978, as a replacement for both the Hague and
Hague/Visby Rules.
So far, most countries still apply the Hague Rules in some
version, but in international practice, five years is an insufficient
amount of time for the global introduction and enforcement of a
law-making treaty. Part of the delay is due to bureaucratic
obstacles, but much more is due to uncertainty about the
consequences of implementation for national law and policy. Many
and varied are the reasons why a country may agree to a treaty, yet
subsequently fail to ratify and enforce it. In the case of the Hamburg
Rules, the major maritime nation states appear hesitant to adopt the
*Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University. The ideas expressed here have grown from

the author's involvement in the Dalhousie Ocean Studies Programme, The Future
of Canadian Carriage of Goods By Water Law, a Study for Transport Canada,
1982. He alone is responsible for these ideas.
1. The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law
Relating to Bills of Lading (hereafter the "Hague Rules"). They are given force in
Canada by the Carriage of Goods by Water Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C- 15, enacted in

1936 (hereafter "COGWA").
2. Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, in force in 1977, except in Canada
(hereafter the "'Hague/Visby Rules").
3. United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978 (hereafter
the "Hamburg Rules"). For their background, see Shah, "The Revision of the
Hague Rules on Bills of Lading Within the UN System - Key Issues", in
Mankabady, ed., The Hamburg Rules on the Carriageof Goods by Sea (1978) p. 1.
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new principles. 4 Much of their equivocation is undoubtedly about
the commercial impact of the rules. However, some of their
uncertainty concerns the legal aspects of the Hamburg Rules as
compared with those of the Hague Rules.
This article will review the legal merits of replacing the Hague
Rules, almost sixty years after their adoption, with the Hamburg
Rules. In order to do so, some perspective on the Hague Rules is
first necessary before a comparison of their legal competence and
that of the Hamburg Rules can be made.
II. Significance of the Hague Rules
Shortly before the creation of the Hague Rules, a number of
countries had passed national legislation regulating carriage by sea.
The United States Harter Act was the first, in 1893. 5 Australia 6 and
Canada followed, but Great Britain noticeably refrained until just
before the signing of the Hague Rules. 7 In fact, the Canadian Water
Carriage of Goods Act of 19108 became the model for the Hague
Rules. 9 But apart from these latter day enactments, carriage by sea
had traditionally been governed by the common law.
Common carriers of goods were generally considered to be
insurers of their cargoes.' 0 The only excuses for their otherwise
absolute responsibility for the goods they carried were that the loss
was caused by an act of God, an act of the Queen's enemies,
inherent vice, or a general average sacrifice." This quaint language
sufficiently demonstrates the antiquity of the law, but also demands
an explanation in more modern terms.
An act of God is "any accident as to which he (the carrier) can
show that it is due to natural causes, directly and exclusively,
without human intervention, and that it could not have been
4. As of 7 April 1983, the Hamburg Convention had been ratified or acceded to by
nine states and signed by twenty-five countries (UN doc. A/CN.9/237/Add.2).
Canada has not accepted the Hamburg Rules.
5. 46 U.S.C. 190.
6. Sea Carriage of Goods Act, 1904.
7. The Carriage of Goods By Sea Act, 1924, Stats. U.K. 1924, c. 22.

8. Stats. Can. 1909-10, c. 61.
9. Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading (18 ed., Mocatta, Mustill, Boyd,
1974), p. 403.
10. Paterson Steamships Ltd. v. Canadian Cooperative Wheat Producers Ltd.,
[1934] A.C. 538 at 544 (P.C.).
II. Scrutton, supra, n. 9, p. 198; Payne and Ivamy, Carriageof Goods by Sea (I I
ed. 1979)p. 154.
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prevented by any amount of foresight and pains and care reasonably
to be expected from him.' 2 The Queen's enemies probably include
only the subjects and public forces of a warring foreign state, and
not pirates, robbers or traitors. 13 "By 'inherent vice' is meant the
unfitness of the goods to withstand the ordinary incidents of the
voyage...,,,14 such as the natural deterioration of fruit in transit.
General average loss "means a partial loss which is shared
generally by the parties to the common venture."' 5 Thus, "all loss
which arises in consequence of extraordinary sacrifices made or
expenses incurred for the preservation of the ship and cargo comes
within the general average, and must be borne proportionately by all
16
who are interested.'
While the common law imposed strict liability, it also recognized
freedom of contract. Parties to a carriage contract were able to
reduce the carrier's legal liability by expressly excepting named
causes of loss. The excepted perils typically included, in addition to
the common law, restraint by executive authorities, seizure under
legal process, piracy, robbery, theft, barratry or deliberate
wrongdoing by the crew, strikes and lockouts, perils of the sea,
jettison, fire, collision, negligence of the crew, insufficiency of
marks and packing, and negligence of the cargo owner.' 7 The
carriers were able to impose ever lengthening disclaimers of
responsibility in their standard form documents and the courts were
prepared to enforce them.
One may question the wisdom, let alone the logic, of law that
straddles the twin principles of strict liability and freedom of
contract. Presumably, the courts had the power to control the
situation which they had allowed to develop. They could have found
the means of regulation, even though they did not yet have such
interpretive tools as the doctrine of fundamental breach. In fact, the
courts did not take control of the situation before the legislatures
began to make changes. Their motivations were as mixed as their
constituents: the considerable shipping interests of the maritime
nations favoured the status quo, while cargo owners in trade12. Nugent v. Smith (1876), I C.P.D. 423 at 444: Turgel Fur Co. Ltd. v.
NorthumberlandFerriesLtd. (1966), 59 D.L.R. (2d) I (N.S.S.C.).
13. Scrutton, supra, n. 9, p. 220; Carver's Carriage by Sea (13 ed. Colinvaux
1982) para. 14.
14. Scrutton, supra, n. 9, p. 224.
15. Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims (2d ed., 1978) p. 274.
16. Birkley v. Presgrave (1801), I East 220 at 228.
17. Ivamy, supra, n. II at 155-163.
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dependent states sought reforms and protection. The divergent
tensions meant that when the legislatures became involved, they
acted in only broadly similar ways.
Sea carriage is preeminently an international matter, for foreign
trade is dependent on it. Furthermore, foreign trade is hindered by a
confusion of national laws and legislation. Uniform international
regulation was, and is, the sensible approach to sea carriage law.
These facts were first acted on by groups and interests outside of
government. A nongovernmental organization, the International
Law Association, promoted the series of meetings that culminated
in the conference of governmental plenipotentiaries who signed the
Brussels Convention and so adopted the Hague Rules.
The uniformity of law which this convention sought to establish
has two aspects. First, the conference delegates strove for
uniformity in the traditional sense between nation states: all
adherents would apply the same rules to contracts of carriage by
sea. Second, the convention asserted uniformity in a novel way by
actually fixing the terms and conditions of each contract of carriage.
Even today, there are very few areas of human transactions in which
the contents of contracts are set by legislation, yet the Brussels
convention accomplished this on an international plane. In
achieving both aspects of uniformity, the Hague Rules were
remarkably successful. However, the very act of fixing the rules at
an international level provided the source of their weakness and
growing inadequacy as time has passed and the shipping industry
has changed.
The Hague Rules, like the national legislation before them, had to
settle the carriage contract if they were to accommodate the interests
and concerns of both carriers and cargo owners. So long as freedom
of contract remained the guiding principle, no great change was
foreseen in the relations between these parties. To afford cargo
owners a measure of protection, the construction of a mandatory
contract seemed the most sensible way to proceed.
What the Hague Rules required primarily, and attained, was an
acceptable distribution of commercial risks and legal responsibilities between carriers and cargo owners. The distribution that
was achieved should not necessarily be assumed to have been the
most fair distribution possible, for it was not a balance of risks and
responsibilities that came about as a result of an objective
assessment of the circumstances of world trade and sea transport in
1924. Rather, it was a reasonable balance, in the sense that a
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distribution of risks was made by an agreement which proved
acceptable to the states that were party to the Brussels Convention
and it was adhered to by most governments of the world thereafter.
The chief feature of the concluded agreement was a compromise
between the legal principles of strict liability and freedom of
contract, which had opposed each other in the traditional common
law of carriage. Cargo owners were required to forgo their claims
on carriers as insurers of their goods in return for a limitation on the
carriers' freedom to disclaim both cargo responsibility and
monetary liability. Under the Hague Rules, a carrier of goods upon
a bill of lading is bound to exercise due diligence in providing a
ship, caring for the cargo, and otherwise executing his agreement of
carriage.' 8 If he does so, yet the goods in his charge are still lost or
damaged, he may excuse himself of responsibility on one of a
number of predetermined grounds 19 or he may limit his liability for
each item of cargo according to a prescribed formula. 20 The Hague
Rules ensure that the cargo owner will never receive less care or
compensation from the carrier than this minimum amount, yet they
21
leave him free to bargain for better treatment if he desires.
The Hague Rules altered the law only for the carriage of general
cargo. Because bulk goods typically take up the entire carrying
space of a vessel, they are usually carried in tramp ships under
charter parties. They were not included in the Hague Rules because
it was supposed that their owners could bargain adequately with the
carriers for protection under the regime of freedom of contract. 2 2 By
distinction, items of general cargo, such as sacks, boxes, and crates
of goods capable of being manhandled, are typically carried under
bills of lading on scheduled liner services. Each individual cargo
owner cannot possibly negotiate the terms of carriage, nor can the
carrier tolerate individual agreements with hundreds of different
shippers. Printed form documents imposing the carrier's standard
conditions were, and still are, the only practical way to conduct
business. Hence, the Hague Rules control the standard terms of
23
carriage under bills of lading.

18. Hague Art. (b), (e), III(1), (2), (3), IV (1).
19. Hague Art. IV (2).

20. Hague Art. IV (5).
21. Hague Arts. II, I1 (8), IV (5), V.

22. Hague Art. V.
23. Hague Art. I(b).
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After the Hague Rules were adopted, much of carriage law
devolved into a matter of the enforcement of local legislation. The
only way to give force and effect to international rules aimed at the
conduct of individuals is through the agency of national
governments. Thus, the national governments had to pass
implementing legislation to give the rules domestic effect before the
courts would apply them. This two-step process of application
inevitably weakens the measure of international uniformity of law.
States were able to enact the rules with slight, but significant,
variations, especially over limits of liability, and some states did
so. 24 Furthermore, national courts, though apprised of the need for
international uniformity of interpretation, are apt to follow their
own views and precedents in applying the local statute. These
divergencies inevitably encouraged forum shopping amongst
disputing carriers and cargo owners.
A more significant effect of enforcing the statutory Hague Rules
of carriage was the change in the nature of litigation. Proof of fact
remained essential and often determinative, but the litigated issues
of law changed in character. Construction of the terms of contract
was largely replaced by interpretation of the statute, and two kinds
of enquiry ensued. Sometimes the dispute fell clearly within the
ambit of the Hague Rules and the court was called upon to interpret
their application to the particular situation. An enormous volume of
such interpretive jurisprudence has been amassed over the past fifty
years, and a wealth of detailed meaning and commercial
consequence has, to date, been ascribed to the rules. At other times,
the question was whether the defaults and damage that occurred
were covered by the Hague Rules. If not, the events in dispute were
once more subject to whatever contractual provision had been
made, usually a broad liberty or exculpatory clause. Consequently,
these cases were hard fought and have given rise to another huge
and technical body of jurisprudence regarding the geographic,
temporal, and physical scope of the Hague Rules. Their borders of
application have now been drawn clearly, though not wholly
efficaciously from a commercial point of view. The stressing of the
border and its technical configuration was, perhaps, the inevitable
result of implanting a statutory regime within the broader flow of

24. For example: UK, £ 100; Australia, $200; Canada, $500; New Zealand, $200;

USA, $500.
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negotiated commercial contracts. Sellers, buyers, shippers, consignees, and carriers of goods are not only concerned with the carriage
of goods by sea, but must also agree to and arrange many other
incidents in international trade. This jurisprudence demonstrates
one of the difficult consequences of attempting to apply a legislative
solution to problematic contractual practices.
On the whole, the drafting of the Hague Rules has proved
remarkably successful. It is, in general, short and simple. The terms
have not been difficult to understand; it is their application that has
proved increasingly troublesome. In some respects, either sufficient
wisdom or enough political will must have been lacking at the time
that the Hague Rules were drafted. As a result, the rules show, in
some places, limitations of conception or solution that have since
bedevilled their application. The case law concerning the scope of
the rules has been principally caused by this deficiency. Even more
troubling has been the need to change the legal standards of
responsibility demanded of carriers and cargo owners by the Hague
Rules in order to keep them up-to-date with developments in the
shipping industry. This need is partly the result of the conclusionary
language of the legislative obligations. The carrier's duty to
exercise "due diligence" is an apt expression of an idea in outline,
but leaves the courts the task of providing it with content. This kind
of statutory standard poses the same task for the courts as any
judge-made tests of reasonableness. Because the courts are forever
determining what is or is not acceptable conduct in infinitely
variable sets of circumstances, they thereby develop detailed
applications of the legal duty which give it concrete meaning for the
time being.
The wealth of interpretive case law on the Hague Rules has been
directed precisely to this task. However, it is unending. Oblique
standards, like "due diligence", are not static, but are relative to
time and events. As commercial life moves on, so must our
conception of diligence. And so the courts are pressed into
continuously modifying and updating the legislative standards of
sea carriage. Were the courts not able to do so, the Hague Rules
would undoubtedly have stultified the law and rendered it
completely out-of-date with current conditions in the shipping
industry. Indeed, legislative fixity has occurred in many respects
and contributes significantly to the difficulty of operating the Hague
Rules today. Where the rules are made concrete by reference to
physical objects, the courts' powers of interpretation are of very
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limited effect. When commercial practice changes so that these
factual points of reference lose their practical significance, the
courts are still required to determine the parties' rights by reference
to them. Thus, the dependence of the Hague Rules upon, for
instance, a "bill of lading", storage under "deck", and limitation
per "package" has forced courts to assess or excuse liability on the
basis of outmoded tests of the circumstances. The consequence of
this type of legislative inadequacy is an increased volume of cases,
initiated by disgruntled claimants who advance every technical
argument imaginable in an effort to circumvent the commercially
unsound results of outdated standards. The recent torrent of
litigation regarding the limitation of liability per "package" in an
age of containerized traffic is a clear example of this unfortunate
effect of the decrepity of the Hague Rules.
The discussion to this point should afford an appreciation of the
need for the Hague Rules to be reformed, and should afford the
basis for an understanding of them as compared with the Hamburg
Rules.

1II. The Hague and Hamburg Rules Compared
The objectives of the two sets of rules are essentially the same; the
Hamburg Rules are simply supposed to do better what the Hague
Rules originally failed to do or subsequently became unable to do.
The Hamburg Rules, however, as the result of inevitable political
and diplomatic compromise at the conference table, display their
own share of blemishes from whatever perspective they are viewed.
The question for serious consideration is, therefore, whether the
Hamburg Rules actually will do a better job of regulating
international sea carriage than the Hague Rules.
Three criteria will be used to make the comparison of the rules.
Posed in the form of questions, they are: (1) Will the Hamburg
Rules be more comprehensive than the Hague Rules in their
regulation of sea carriage transactions? (2) Will the Hamburg Rules
provide greater clarity in the law than the Hague Rules? (3) Will the
Hamburg Rules distribute the risks of sea carriage more fairly than
the Hague Rules in contemporary shipping conditions? The
propriety of each of these questions will be discussed, along with a
consideration of their answers. Their conclusions will foretell the
relative legal merits of the two sets of international rules.
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(a) Comprehensivenessof the Rules
The Hague and the Hamburg Rules are both mandatory regimes of
law. Once they become applicable to a carriage transaction, no
contracting party can evade them or disclaim his responsibilities
under them. 2 5 Consequently, they pretend to exclusive regulation of
the rights and obligations to cargo in sea carriage. This result is the
legal method of enforcing the internationally agreed balance of
commercial risks in the transaction. The rules do permit the parties
to agree to greater responsibilities of carriage, and do not restrict
freedom of contract outside of carriage. Indeed, the parties are free
to arrange their affairs beyond the application of the rules in such a
way as to undermine the rules' intended effects. Evidencing
carriage contracts on waybills, rather than on bills of lading, is an
arguable example. Consequently, the scope of the rules is most
important: the more comprehensive their application to matters that
genuinely affect carriage, the more successful they are likely to be.
Since the Hague and Hamburg Rules share the objective of
establishing mandatory and exclusive regimes, it seems appropriate
to compare the scope of their application and to favour the set that is
more comprehensive.
Many points of similarity exist between the Hague and the
Hamburg Rules, but they are not of principal concern in a
comparison of scope. The differences of application are what matter
and, consequently, will be highlighted here. First, the Hague Rules
are dependent on certain documentation. They apply only to the
carriage of goods that will be covered by a bill of lading. 26 By
contrast, the Hamburg Rules are not limited by documents, but
relate to the character of the transaction. They apply to any contract
of carriage by sea, including a multimodal transport agreement to
the extent of its sea leg. 2 7 An exception is made for carriage under
charter parties in both sets of rules. 28 The evident intent is that the
rules shall govern the carriage of general and unitized cargo in liner
services. Bulk goods moved in tramp ships are commercially quite
different transactions. Since they are typically arranged by charter
party, they are easily distinguished by law. The Hamburg Rules
25. Hague Art. III (8), Hamburg Art. 23.
26. Hague Art. (b). Intention to issue a bill of lading is sufficient. Pyrenne Co. v.
Scindia Navigation Co., [1952] Q.B. 402; Anticosti Shipping Co. v. St. Amand,
[1959] S.C.R. 372.
27. Hamburg Arts. 2, 1 (6).
28. Hague Art. V (2), Hamburg Art. 2(3).
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cover general cargo effectively; the Hague Rules increasingly do
not. Liner companies are giving up bills of lading in favour of
waybills and receipts that are not documents of title. Some have
already moved to electronic transfers of freight data. The modern
shipping industry, consisting of container traffic and administered
by computer processes, is well within the scope of the Hamburg
Rules.
A more important limitation of the Hague Rules is a geographic
29
restraint. Typically, these rules operate only on outbound cargoes.
Imported goods are subject to foreign law, which may apply a
different version of the Hague Rules or even individual laws of its
own creation. If the Hague Rules were truly universal, then the
"proper law" of the carriage contract would always be the same in
content. Whether or not that was the expectation in 1924, it has not
been the result. However, the Hamburg Rules offer a much greater
chance of this uniformity occurring. They are expressly made
applicable to inbound, as well as to outbound, cargoes of states
adhering to the convention. 30 Hence, where either the exporting or
importing country implements the Hamburg Rules, trade between
them will fall under those rules. Where only one state is party to the
Hamburg Rules, local courts may still be faced with a conflict of
laws. For instance, should the suit of a consignee which is brought
at the port of destination, in a jurisdiction that applies the Hamburg
Rules, be decided by those rules or by the law of the port of loading,
namely, the Hague Rules? The international and statutory force of
the Hamburg Rules will make it hard for courts to choose some
other law. Cargo owners, whether they be shippers or consignees,
may confidently expect a much more uniform regime of carriage
law under the Hamburg Rules.
The most important difference in the scope of the two sets of rules
may well be their temporal extent. The period of responsibility
under the Hague Rules is stated as extending "from the time when
the goods are loaded on to the time when they are discharged from
the ship." 3 1 "Loaded on" is interpreted to mean that period starting
at the moment that the loading begins, that is, when the ship's tackle

29. COGWA s. 2, Hague Art. X.
30. And through several other places of substantial contact with the particular
transaction; Hamburg Art. 2(1).
31. Hague Art. I(e).
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first hooks the cargo. 32 Hence, the Hague Rules are commonly said
to apply from tackle to tackle. As a result, the carrier who has
custody of the goods before loading or after discharge is not subject
to the Hague Rules, but may contractually limit or exclude his
responsibility as he sees fit. The rules themselves expressly confirm
33
this power.
In practice, carriers often take charge of cargoes in the port of
loading before they are put on board, and deliver them ashore at the
port of discharge. Indeed, a much higher proportion of the damage
and loss to goods today occurs not at sea, but during dockside
moving and storage activities carried out by cargo handlers who are
instructed by the carriers. Subject to the peculiarities of local law,
carriers are able to exempt themselves from responsibility for loss
and damages suffered during these risky activities. Often, the cargo
handlers also enjoy the same exemption. 34 Even if the carriers and
handlers do not contract out of caring for the cargo, the applicable
national laws regarding bailment and custody of property display
great diversity in standards of care. In consequence, the distribution
of risks of carriage determined by the Hague Rules is disturbed
when the goods are not at sea. Commercially speaking, however,
the goods are in carriage as long as the carrier has them, whether
they are ashore or afloat. This viewpoint is particularly clear given
the increasing instances of multimodal transport. The sea carrier has
charge of the goods from the moment that they are received from
one land carrier until they are transferred to another.
Unlike the Hague Rules, the Hamburg Rules are intended to
cover the entire period of carriage. They are expressed as applying
to "the period during which the carrier is in charge of the goods at
the port of loading, during the carriage and at the port of
discharge." ' 35 Not surprisingly, this has been dubbed the
port-to-port rule. Unfortunately, in attempting to detail when the
32. Pyrenne Co. v. Scindia Navigation Co., [1952] Q.B. 402; Falconbridge
Nickel Mines Ltd. v. Chimo Shipping Ltd., [1974] S.C.R. 933.
33. Hague Art. VII.
34. Midland Silicones v. Scruttons, [ 1962] A.C. 446 (H.L.); (The Lake Bosomwe)
Canadian General Electric Co., Ltd. v. Pickford and Black, [1971] S.C.R. 41;
(The Eurymedon) New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd. v. A .M. Satterthwaite and Co.
Ltd., [1974] 1 LI.R. 534 (H.L.); (The New York Star) Salmond and Spraggon
(Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty. Ltd., [1980] 2 LI.R. 317
(P.C.); Miida Electronics Inc. v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd. ( 1981), 124 D.L.R. (3d)

33 (F.C.A.).
35. Hamburg Art. 4.
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carrier can be said to be "in charge" of the goods, the subsequent
paragraphs leave open the possible interpretation that he may
contractually limit his port-to-port duties to a degree approaching
tackle-to-tackle liability. Whether the courts will accept any such
attempt in the face of the evident purpose and stated principle of the
Hamburg Rules remains to be seen. In the event that such an attempt
is not successful, the port-to-port principle of the Hamburg Rules
would overcome much of the weakness, not to say circumvention,
of the Hague Rules.
Transshipment is another aspect of the temporal scope of carriage
that the Hague Rules do not regulate. In the interest of the safety of
the goods, a contracting carrier is bound to transport the cargo to its
destination. He is not permitted to subcontract the transit or to
transship the goods. Nevertheless, the parties may agree to
segmented transport, the carrier may stipulate for a power to
transship, and sometimes he may incur a duty to do so as the result
of an emergency. 3 6 When goods are lawfully transshipped, they are
of necessity put beyond the ship's tackle, and so the carrier is free of
the Hague Rules and is able to disclaim any responsibility for the
goods. 3 7 As a result, the goods rest in midcarriage, at the risk of the
cargo owner, in some distant port where he has no control over
them.
Containerization of cargo has made transshipment an increasingly
common feature of carriage. Warehouse-to-warehouse carriage
necessarily involves several transshipments between the modes of
transit. But even in sea transit itself, modem scheduled liner
services for container traffic are increasingly organized in collection
and distribution patterns around transshipment centres, rather than
in a multitude of direct routes. In spite of the commercial
efficiencies of these services and even considering the reduction of
the risk of loss and damage to containerized cargo at transshipment,
the law does not support them. Indeed, transshipment is outside the
bounds of the Hague Rules. By comparison, the Hamburg Rules at
least ensure that the contracting carrier will always remain
responsible for the goods until their final delivery. 38 Thus, the
contracting carrier is liable for lost cargo during transshipment
36. Owen v. Outerbridge (1896) 26 S.C.R. 272. The conditions of such a duty are
discussed in Carver, supra, n. 13, para. 1245.
37. Marcellino Gonzalez v. James Nourse Ltd., [1936] I K.B. 565; Captain v.
FarEastern Steamship Co. (1978), 7 B.C.L.R. 279 (B.C.S.C.).
38. Hamburg Art. 10(1).
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ashore and during on-carriage by another party, who, naturally, is
individually responsible for his part of the transit. 39 A major
exception to this comprehensive principle was made in the
Convention at the behest of shipowners.40 As a result, the Hamburg
Rules permit the contracting carrier to exempt himself of
responsibility for a segment of the transit where the contract
explicitly provides for part-performance by a named actual
carrier.41
There are two serious disadvantages to the exception allowed for
the cargo owner. First, in the event of a claim, the cargo owner may
have great difficulty in determining how the loss or damage was
caused and, hence, which carrier was at fault. The practical
difficulties for the cargo owner of gathering proof of events over
large periods of time and great distances cannot be underestimated.
It is obviously relatively easier for the industry participants - that
is, the carriers themselves - to do so. Second, if the cargo owner
can establish who the defaulting party is, the actual carrier may be
resident in a foreign jurisdiction and may have no local agent, like
the contracting carrier, with whom the carriage is agreed upon and
with whom the issue can subsequently be disputed. Even so, the
exception does not extend to the transshipment itself, so that, under
the Hamburg Rules, the cargo owner is assured that his goods are
always the responsibility of some carrier that is known to him.
The carriage of deck cargo is another incident that falls outside
the scope of the Hague Rules. Since the risks of the sea and weather
damaging goods exposed above deck are obviously much greater
than the risks to cargo stowed in watertight holds, the Hague Rules
do not subject carriers to the same degree of responsibility for them.
They do, however, oblige carriers to stow the cargo below deck
unless deck carriage is specifically agreed upon in advance and the
face of the bill of lading is so claused. 42 The courts have been strict
about these requirements. 43 The reason may be that, because lawful
carriage on deck is outside the Hague Rules, the carrier is therefore

39. Hamburg Art. 10(2).
40. See Tetley, "Articles 9 to 13 of the Hamburg Rules", in Mankabady, ed., The
Hamburg Rules on the Carriageof Goods by Sea (1978) p. 200.
41. Hamburg Art. 11.
42. Hague Art. 1(c).
43. Svenska Traktor Aktiebolaget v. Maritime Agencies (Southampton) Ltd.,
[1953] 2 Q.B. 295; Grace PlasticsLtd. v. The Bernd Wesch 11, [1971] F.C. 273.
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free to excuse himself from all liability for the cargo. 4 4 The
alternative extremes of liability do not provide a sensible system of
regulation, in any event, and have become increasingly ridiculous
given the current containerization of goods. Purpose-built container
ships are designed to carry containers, stacked from the floor of the
holds upwards, without regard to deckline, and the containers
themselves provide waterproof protection. In these circumstances,
the distinction in the Hague Rules between carriage above and
below deck makes no sense at all.
In the alternative, the Hamburg Rules contain simple, practical
provisions. The practice of carrying goods on deck is always within
the scope of the rules, but is subject to special arrangements. That
is, the ship may only carry goods on deck by agreement with the
shipper or by custom of the trade. Deck carriage that is not in
accordance with these standards will attract increasingly severe
45
liability for the carrier, depending on the error of his ways.
Lawful deck carriage will attract the usual standard of care for
cargo. If the risks are greater, the carrier presumably can refuse the
cargo or increase the freight. Thus, ships in the container trade, for
instance, may custom stow containers above or below deck. The
cargo owner may expect an ordinary standard of care for his goods,
but the carrier will be able to limit his liability in the usual way.
Delay in delivery of the cargo is another incident that is not
covered by the Hague Rules. In this case, however, the courts have
not had much difficulty in regarding unreasonable delays as a
breach of the carrier's underlying duty of dispatch. 46 Delays,
unaccompanied by physical damage or loss of the goods, create
purely financial injuries, but since economic losses are compensable
in contract, the courts have applied the ordinary rules for
measurement of damages. 47 However, a delay of the goods has
quite a different character from the loss or destruction of the cargo.
Physical injury to the property may be traced to an event that
occurred at a single moment in time. Proof of this cause is an
important element to establishing legal liability. By comparison,
delay is not a physical, but a temporal, problem. In particular, it is
not an event, but a continuous incident; it does not occur at one
44. H.B. Contracting v. Northland Shipping (1971), 24 D.L.R. (3d) 209
(B.C.C.A.).
45. Hamburg An. 9.
46. Ivamy, supra, n. 11,95; Carver, supra, n. 13, paras. 1205-1212.
47. (The Heron 1H)Koufos v. Czarnikow, [ 1969] I A.C. 350 (H.L.).
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time, but is the cumulative effect of the lack of dispatch of the
carrier. Without fixed dates for different stages of the carriage for example, guarantees of loading times or sailing dates - there is
no telling whether a delay has been committed until the goods fail to
arrive by the expected delivery time. Indeed, apportioning blame
between several carriers when, in fact, it is the last who has caused
the delay may be extremely difficult.
Perhaps for these reasons, the Hamburg Rules, though they
expressly include delay, do so by creating a separate scheme of
liability. They define delay individually and apart from loss or
damage, 4 8 and fix a different limit of liability by reference to
freight. 4 9 Delay and loss are brought together by the rule that a
delay in delivery of sixty days entitles the cargo owner to treat the
goods as lost 50 and, as a consequence, to receive compensation
according to the usual limitation per package or kilo. There are,
however, a number of unexposed obscurities in the definition and
application of the special scheme for covering delay, as well as in
the obligation and liability that would apply. 5 1 Thus, it is rather
difficult to assert that the comprehensiveness of the Hamburg Rules
in this respect is much of an advantage over the Hague Rules.
Two other differences in the scope of the two sets of rules may be
noted in passing, as they are of less commercial importance, though
are still of significance. Although the Hague Rules are mandatory
and disclaimers of obligation are void, 52 they contain no prohibition
against the attempt at or the inclusion of disclaimers. By contrast,
the Hamburg Rules reinforce their obligatory character by granting
compensation for losses caused through the inclusion of invalid
clauses in the carriage contract. 53 The Hamburg Rules also require that more details be included in the bill of lading than do
the Hague Rules. The practical reason is to ensure that the cargo
owner is adequately informed of the facts he needs in order to
enforce his rights. Thus, the extra information includes the names of
all the ports of loading and discharge, so as to determine whether
the Hamburg Rules apply to the transaction; a statement of the
48. Hamburg Art. 5(2).
49. Hamburg Art. 6(l)(b).
50. Hamburg Art. 5(3).
51. These matters are explored by M. Ganado, Shipowner Responsibilityfor Delay
in the Carriage of Goods By Sea Under Bills of Lading, unpublished LL.M.
Thesis, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 1983.
52. Hague Art. 111(8).
53. Hamburg Art. 23.

600 The Dalhousie Law Journal

freight payable by the consignee, so that he has notice of the
amount; and the names of the contracting carrier and any others, so
as to identify the responsible party at all times throughout the
carriage. 54
There are no matters in the Hague Rules which are not included in
the Hamburg Rules. If anything, longer experience has led to
greater elaboration in the Hamburg Rules. It is evident from this
survey of the differences in application of the rules that the
Hamburg Convention is considerably more comprehensive in
commercially important ways.
(b) Clarityof the Law
Obscurity in the expression of the rules leads to commercial
uncertainty, breeds litigation, and encourages complicated drafting
of contractual clauses to evade the uncertainties. Indeed, it obstructs
the objective of the rules, namely, to fix the terms of carriage
contracts. Clarity of the law is an evident virtue and an obvious
criterion for comparison of the rules.
Much could be made of the difference in the style of
draftsmanship of the Hague and the Hamburg Rules. The relative
brevity and conciseness of the Hague Rules is more akin to common
law legislation than the diplomatic wordiness of the Hamburg
Convention is. The important matter, however, is how well the
rules convey the legal concepts which are intended to capture the
agreed-upon commercial standards of conduct and distribution of
risks in the carriage. Specifically, the question is whether one set of
rules or the other expresses these concepts with more precision.
Accordingly, comparison will be made here only between the
expression of the major principles of the rules.
The Hague Rules display obscurities of commission and omission
which the makers of the Hamburg Rules had the opportunity to
correct. The drafters of the Hamburg Rules did so, in part, but some
of the old difficulties persist and new ones have inevitably
appeared. The principal difficulties of commission in the Hague
Rules concern the points of physical reference to the goods and the
ship. As was already pointed out, the references to a "bill of
lading", a cargo "package or unit", carriage "under deck", and
"carrier" identity are no longer congruent with the practices of the
54. Hamburg Arts. 15, 11(1).
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shipping industry. The Hamburg Rules attack these obscurities and
eradicate most of them.
Though the shipper may still call for a bill of lading, 55 the
application of the Hamburg Rules is not dependent on it or on the
issuance of any form of documentation. The itemization of cargo is
important for the calculation of the maximum limit of the carrier's
liability. Packages of cargo have increased in size with the advent of
mechanical unitization at the same time as the fixed financial limit
has depreciated as the result of inflation. The Hamburg Rules tackle
this problem, as is discussed in the next section. The problem of
establishing carrier identity has been resolved under the Hamburg
Rules in the process of dealing with transshipment and through
carriage. The carrier is defined as the party that is contracting with
the shipper, unless additional parties are named in the documents.
Deck cargo is now included within the scope of the Hamburg Rules.
However, the distinction between carriage above and below deck
will remain significant to the determination of the appropriate limit
of carrier liability. The difficult matter of determining the deckline
in container ships may still persist when the carrier defaults.
Apart from deck cargo, therefore, the Hamburg Rules have
removed the obscurities of commission that exist in the Hague
Rules. They have done so by changing the reference points for their
application and, thus, have defined away the difficulties of the
Hague Rules. Even in the case of deck cargo, inclusion of this
category within the scope of the rules has reduced this obscurity to a
more limited enquiry in the event of default.
The chief error of omission from the Hague Rules concerns their
application to employees, agents, and subcontractors. Since no
provision was made, principles of national law have determined
whether those who work under instructions from the carrier are
subject to the rules. Most of the problems that have arisen have
surrounded the claims by these parties, when in the role of
defendants to actions brought for lack of care of the goods, to the
benefit of limited liability under the rules. Suits against the master,
crew members, stevedores, or ship's agents are not common, but
when brought they are often designed to circumvent the limitation
of liability granted to the carrier by the Hague Rules.
The difficulties of the liability of employees and agents lie in the
doctrine of privity. As third parties to the contract between the
55. Hamburg Art. 14.
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carrier and the cargo owner, they cannot demand the benefit of the
rules implied into it. 56 Yet, a suit brought against them, rather than
the carrier, in an effort to evade the rules is not attractive either. The
issue has been much debated, both in and out of the courts. 57 The
cases have occurred around the construction of "Himalaya
clauses",58 which expressly seek to extend disclaimers of
responsibility and limitations of liability to all who work for the
carrier. A contractual nexus with the cargo owner is constructed
through the agency of the carrier.
The Hamburg Rules appear, at first glance, to have resolved the
continuing dispute. Servants and agents are expressly entitled to
avail themselves of the carriers' defences and limits of liability, so
long as they act within the scope of their employ. 59 The article is
clear as to the position of employees and agents: to that extent, the
issue is settled in their favour. However, the issue remains open in
the case of subcontractors, such as stevedores, terminal operators,
wharfingers, and wharehousemen. Independent contractors, as
these persons are often categorized, constitute a separate class from
servants and agents in the common law. Unfortunately, the courts
are given no guidance as to how to interpret the reference to servants
and agents only. 60 The threefold classification of the common law
may be too well ingrained to overcome the admonitions of the rules
to international uniformity of interpretation. 6 1 At any rate,
Himalaya clauses will probably continue to be used, given the
uncertainty of interpretation, and the old obscurity of the law will
persist.
Fresh doubts are raised by the Hamburg Rules where new
concepts are invoked. The application of the rules to the contract
between carrier and shipper, regardless of documentation, has given
rise to an as yet unanswered question about. the status of the
consignee. What is his legal relationship to the carrier? At common
law, contractual rights of carriage were not assignable before the
56. Midland Silicones v. Scruttons, [1962] A.C. 446 (H.L.).
57. See the cases at n. 34 and the vigorous criticism of Tetley, supra, n. 15, pp.
382-383. Carver's new edition adds an illuminating new chapter on the debate.
Carver, supra, n. 13, paras. 333-412.
58. After the name of the ship in Adler v. Dickson, [ 1955] I Q.B. 158.
59. Hamburg Art. 7(2).
60. Unlike the Visby Amendments to the Hague Rules, which, while adding
protection for servants and agents, expressly exclude independent contractors.
Hague/Visby Art. IV bis (2).
61. Hamburg Art. 3.
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Bills of Lading Acts. 6 2 Since then, however, the holder of a bill of
lading can enforce it against the carrier. This legislation predated,
but was sufficient for, the Hague Rules. The consignee of goods by
waybill or freight receipt under the Hamburg Rules may not be so
obviously protected. Since the Bills of Lading Acts refer only to
bills of lading and since the Hamburg Rules merely define the
consignee and do not explain his rights, 63 the complications of
assignment at common law may occur once again. This unnecessary
obscurity may yet be overcome by domestic amendment of the Bills
of Lading Acts.
The new port-to-port principle for application of the Hamburg
Rules is also a source of uncertainty. Although the port-to-port
period of carrier responsibility is clear in principle, its operative
details are open to varied interpretation and manipulation.
Determining the moment at which the carrier is deemed to take
charge of, and to hand over, the goods depends on too many
variables. Indeed, on close reading it seems possible for the carrier
to contract to take over the goods from the shipper at the rail of the
ship 64 and to discharge them over the side for the consignee. 65 This
arrangement is nothing more than the tackle-to-tackle law of the
Hague Rules, which the port-to-port principle is supposed to
replace. Such obscurity is not a happy result of the Hamburg
Conference. Only time and litigation will tell what express
contractual refinements will be allowed to cut back the generality of
the port-to-port principle to cover a smaller period of carrier
responsibility.
The other main new source of obscurity in the Hamburg Rules
concerns the standard of carrier responsibility. The duty of care for
the cargo will be discussed on its merits in the next section, on
fairness in the rules. The point of clarity in the law concerns the
scope for comparative interpretation of the old and new obligations.
The language in the Hague Rules 6 6 obliging the carrier "to exercise
due diligence" to make the ship seaworthy and to "properly and
carefully" carry the goods is very similar to the requirement in the
Hamburg Rules that he take "all measures that could reasonably be
62. Bills of Lading Act. Stats. U.K. 1855, c.

1970, c.B-6.
63. Hamburg Art. 1(4).

64. Hamburg Art. 4(2)(a)(i).
65. Hamburg Art. 4(2)(b)(ii).
66. Hague Art. 111(1), (2).

I11;Bills of Lading Act, R.S.C.
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required" 6 7 in the circumstances. Indeed, it is assumed that the
essence of all these expressions is one and the same - the standard
of reasonable care. Yet, modern shipping conditions demand
different standards of conduct from the practices that were
acceptable at the advent of the Hague Rules. While reasonableness
is a concept that may be imbued with expectations relative to current
times and situations, there is considerable risk that the fascination of
common lawyers for precedent may cause much of the past
jurisprudence on the Hague Rules to infuse the novel interpretation
of the Hamburg Rules. As much as anything, the intrinsic
uncertainty of the content of "reasonableness" encourages this
danger, but any more certain, yet fixed, standard of care would
expose the Hamburg Rules to intractable obscurities in their
application, as commercial conditions of carriage continue to
change.
It is difficult to estimate from this survey whether or not the
Hamburg Rules will afford greater clarity in the law of carriage than
the Hague Rules. Most of the major obscurities of the Hague Rules
have been eliminated. Aside from the status of subcontractors, the
opportunity to correct the problems shown up by past experience
has been well used. However, the new obscurities which surround
the application and the standard of the Hamburg Rules affect the
core of their reformative objectives. Their importance, yet lack of
clarity, make litigation inevitable, but whether the courts will be
able to clarify them is less certain.
(c) Fairnessof the Risks
The purpose of the rules is to fix a fair balance of commercial risks
and legal duties in the contractual relations between carriers and
cargo owners. The balance achieved under the Hague Rules was, as
has already been pointed out, not necessarily fair in an objective
sense, but was an acceptable compromise subjectively. A principal
motivation for the Hamburg Rules was a sense that the changes in
the shipping industry over the last fifty years were so great that the
balance of risks in the Hague Rules had been undermined. The
carrier's risks have changed, to his advantage, and have done so to
such an extent that the compromise on his liability is no longer
acceptable.
67. Hamburg Art. 5( I).
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If the Hague Rules fail to maintain the original balance of risks in
contemporary carriage situations, do the Hamburg Rules redress the
imbalance? A comparison of the two sets of rules cannot yield an
absolute measure of their fairness, but it will permit a summation of
their relative worth. The promotion of business efficacy in
commercial relations is an old and respected principle of law. 68 The
Hague Rules proved efficacious for many years before technological developments substantially altered shipping practices. If the
Hamburg Rules redistribute the risks and costs of sea carriage under
modem conditions in a way equivalent to that of the Hague Rules,
they may be said to be at least as fair and may be expected to be
equally efficacious. Comparison of the rules will demonstrate their
relative fairness and efficacy.
Fairness in law is both substantive and procedural. There is little
value in a right without a remedy for its breach and a process of
redress. In carriage matters, for example, a claimant cargo owner
must be able to sue and must have access to evidence of events
during the transit if he is to have a fair chance of establishing the
liability of the carrier for default in caring for his goods. The Hague
and the Hamburg Rules determine both the substantive and
procedural responsibilities in the carriage contract. The distribution
of commercial risks is effected by an integrated group of legal
provisions about standards of cargo care, burdens of proof of
conduct, limits of financial liability, and procedures for claims. For
convenience, they will be compared here separately.
The procedures for claims under the Hamburg Rules are
somewhat more relaxed than those under the Hague Rules. The
periods of time within which notice of loss can be given and suits
can be brought have been lengthened. Notice of loss or damage to
cargo ought to be given promptly, so that the carrier can be
informed and relevant evidence can be preserved, preferably before
the ship leaves port. The rules confirm this principle. 69 However,
difficulties occur in fulfilling it where the damage is concealed. In
such circumstances, the Hague Rules give the consignee three days
of grace in which to give notice. 70 The Hamburg Rules grant a more

68.
69.
the
70.

The Moorcock (1889), 14 P.D. 64 at 68.
Hague Art. 111 (6) demands notice be given at the time the consignee receives
goods. Hamburg Art. 19(1) requires notice no later than the next day.
Hague Art. 111(6).
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generous extension of fifteen days, 7 ' and seem more appropriate in
light of the nature of the problem.
Delay in bringing an action, even though notice of loss has been
given, is always grounds for nonsuit. The limitation period in the
Hague Rules of one year 7 2 seems surprisingly short when compared
to the usual time bar for contracts, and so it has proved. A year is
too often insufficient and agreements for extension are common.
Part of the Gold Clause Agreement of the British Maritime Law
Association7 3 generalized a two-year limit amongst its adherents.
The Hamburg Rules have formalized this experience under the
Hague Rules by adopting a two-year time bar, fixing the
commencement of the period and assuring that defendants may have
74
recourse on any indemnity agreements, even after the time limit.
The Hamburg Rules also include provisions to regulate the choice of
court7 5 or arbitration 7 6 in which to bring a claim. In the absence of
controls in the Hague Rules, choice of forum clauses are frequently
included in bills of lading at the carriers' convenience. Cargo
owners face the costly and inhibiting choice of bringing their claims
in the distant location cited in the carriage document or fighting a
jurisdiction battle over forum shopping. The thrust of the Hamburg
Rules is to allow the use of jurisdiction and arbitration clauses to
continue, but to offer the cargo claimant an overriding choice
between the named place and several other locations associated with
the carriage transaction. They include the carrier's place of
business, the port of loading, and, most conveniently, the port of
discharge.
These procedural provisions do not impinge on the efficacy of
carriage, but they do affect its cost indirectly. If the carrier can
avoid a claim by extending negotiations for a settlement beyond the
time limit for suit or by pre-selecting awkward locations for
adjudication, then he can shift the cost of liability to the cargo
owner, who suffered the loss, and his insurer. In this area, on which
the Hague Rules barely touch, the Hamburg Rules do not readjust a
distribution of risks of loss that has gone wrong. Yet, the Hamburg
71. Hamburg Art. 19(2).
72. Hamburg Art. III (b). para. 3. Amended to two years under Hague/Visby Art.

111(6).
73.
74.
75.
76.

Set out in
Hamburg
Hamburg
Hamburg

Tetley, supra, n. 15, p. 563.
Art. 20.
Art. 21.
Art. 22.
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Rules are eminently fairer in the sense that they make provisions for
the procedures of claims in ways that experience under the Hague
Rules has shown are necessary.
The standards of cargo care are the core of the rules. The
distribution of the commercial risks of carriage is spelled out in
terms of legal responsibilities towards the goods, owed by each
party and, primarily, by the carrier. The Hague Rules took the
approach of specifying the different aspects of carriage to be
attended to and granted the carrier a long list of excuses for failing
to do so. Thus, the Hague Rules are said to operate "in relation to
the loading, handling, storage, carriage, custody, care and
discharge. . ." of the goods. 7 7 The carrier is bound to fulfill all
these functions "properly and carefully". 7 8 He is also bound at the
beginning of the voyage to provide a vessel that is seaworthy,
cargoworthy, and properly manned, equipped, and supplied. 79 In
addition, there is the negative inference that the carrier must
complete his obligations without unreasonable deviation, 8 0 but
there is no mention of any responsibility to do so without undue
delay. 8 ' To all of these different responsibilities, the carrier has a
82
list of "excepted perils".
A more cumbersome way of expressing legal obligations could
hardly be imagined. Worse, the variety of different facets of
liability and excuse have led to fierce disputes and fine distinctions.
In their place, the Hamburg Rules impose a brief but encompassing
standard. The carrier is liable for loss, damage, and delay while the
goods are in his charge, unless he can show that he, his employees,
and his agents "took all measures that could reasonably be required
8 3
to avoid" the injury.
The merits of the alternative draftmanship are not so important as
the legal standards that are imposed. Cutting through the phrasing to
the pith of the obligations, there is good reason to think that the
Hague and the Hamburg Rules both establish the same relative
77. Hague Art. 1I.
78. Hague Art. 111(2).
79. Hague Art. 111(l), IV(I).
80. Hague Art. IV(4).
81. Carriage with dispatch and without deviation are obligations of pre-existing
common law and will normally be applied to the contract, supplementary to the
Hague Rules. See the references at n. 46.
82. Hague Art. IV(2).
83. Hamburg Art. 5(l). Liability for unreasonable deviations under this paragraph
is supplemented by Art. 5(6).
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principle of carrier responsibility, which may be summed up as
reasonable care. "Due diligence" towards the ship, "reasonable"
deviation in the voyage, and the proper and careful carrying of the
goods, as expressed in the Hague Rules, add up to the requirement
of "all reasonable measures" contained in the Hamburg Rules. The
content of the standard - what is reasonable conduct in the
circumstances - will vary with the particular carriage.
The chief differences between the rules lie in the exceptions to
them. Having established an affirmative principle of liability for
fault, the Hague Rules proceed to grant many exceptions. The
Hamburg Rules, however, do not. Hence, the question of
comparative fairness in the standards of care under the rules
devolves to an investigation of the impact of the exceptions listed in
the Hague Rules. Their omission from the Hamburg Rules may
suggest a relative generosity to carriers under the Hague Rules, until
a closer scrutiny of the rules is made. Most of the excepted perils in
the Hague Rules involve events that are beyond the control of the
carrier and which are not the function of acts of the shipper or
characteristics of the goods. The carrier is not liable for damage
caused by perils of the sea, acts of God, acts of war, acts of public
enemies, restraints of lawful authorities, seizure under legal
process, quarantine, strikes, lock-outs, and riots, if he could
reasonably avoid them. 8 4 Indeed, he will not be liable for loss
arising from any other cause without his actual fault or the neglect
of his employees and agents. 8 5 Nor will the carrier be responsible
for damage resulting from acts or omissions of the cargo owner or
inherent vice, insufficiency in packing, or inadequacy of marks of
86
the goods.
The four exceptions which depend on the carrier's conduct, rather
than on persons or events beyond his control, are negligence, fire,
rescue, and latent defects. Of these, the last two are not true
exceptions. The saving of life and property 87 are self-evident human
purposes and are legitimate grounds to deviate from the regular
voyage. However, since deviations must be reasonable in order to
be lawful, this exception will not overreach the principle. Thus,
deviations that are made in order to save property for salvage are not
within the exception when they do not constitute reasonable
84. Hague Art. IV(2)(c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (j), (k).

85. Hague Art. IV(2)(q).
86. Hague Art. IV(2)(i), (m), (n), (o).
87. Hague Art. IV (2)(1).
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conduct. 8 8 Similarly, a latent defect in the ship which renders it
unseaworthy is only an excuse when "not discoverable by due
diligence." '8 9 Thus, rescue and latent defects are not so much
exceptions to the standard of reasonable care in carriage as express
examples of it. By contrast, fire and negligence are genuine
exceptions to liability and, if liberally applied, would substantially
reverse the principle of responsibility for fault. However, they are
not without constraint. Damage to goods by fire is an exception,
"unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier." 90 Thus,
the carrier will never avoid his liability where he can be blamed
personally for the fire. He is excused where the fire is set by
strangers, where it arises accidentally, or where it results from
unknown causes, but these situations are not inconsistent with the
principle of fault. They are comparable to the other exceptions for
events and persons beyond the carrier's control. The chief
advantage of the exception is that the carrier is excused from the
operation of the principle of responsibility for the acts of his
employees. He will not be liable for loss caused through the fault or
neglect of his crew members and other workmen in permitting or
failing to prevent the outbreak of fire. Unreasonable conduct by
employees which results in loss by fire is an exception to the
carrier's obligations to exercise reasonable care.
Negligence is an even broader exception. The carrier is not
responsible for damage resulting from the "act, neglect or default"
of the master and the crew "in the navigation or in the management
of the ship." 9 1 Since the carrier's obligations are almost wholly
performed by his employees, he would virtually never be liable for
cargo loss unless he personally intervened in the carriage. Not
surprisingly, the phrases modifying the exception have been
interpreted to limit this conclusion. Thus, the carrier will only be
excused for his employees' negligence in the navigation of the ship,
and not for his mismanagement of the cargo. The exception depends
on an ability to distinguish between an act's effects on the ship and
on the cargo. 92 The distinction is often difficult on the facts, and
88. Stag Line Ltd. v. Foscolo, Mango and Co., [1932] A.C. 328 (H.L.); Carver,
supra, n. 13, para. 547; Tetley, supra, n. 15, 351-354.
89. Hague Art. IV(2)(p).
90. Hague Art. IV(2)(b).
91. Hague Art. IV(2)(a).
92. Gosse Millerd v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine, [1929] A.C. 223
(H.L.); Kalamazoo PaperCo. v. C.P.R., [ 1950] S.C.R. 356.
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may be somewhat impressionistic, especially when the error affects
the venture as a whole. 93 A collision, for example, may injure both
ship and cargo. 94 The wide scope and the uncertainty of application
make this exception very controversial.
The omission of all these exceptions from the Hamburg Rules
would appear to signify their abolition. However, the provision in
the Hamburg Rules for carrier responsibility is not devoid of an
escape clause. The carrier is liable for cargo loss unless he can show
that he took all reasonable measures to prevent it. Thus, he may
excuse himself where he acted reasonably but the loss nevertheless
occurred. In other words, he is no more liable under the Hamburg
Rules than under the Hague Rules for losses he could not prevent
because they were caused by persons and events beyond his
reasonable control. Presumably, therefore, the carrier may, under
the Hamburg Rules, assert as excuses arguments analogous to all
but two of the exceptions granted in the Hague Rules, according to
what the circumstances will support. Fire and negligence are the
only exceptions in the Hague Rules which run counter to the
principle of responsibility for unreasonable error, the principle on
which both sets of rules are built.
Vicarious liability for the negligence of the carrier's employees in
causing loss by fire or mismanagement of the ship is what
distinguishes the standards of care in the rules. In these two
respects, the Hamburg Rules have undoubtedly altered carriers'
obligations under the Hague Rules. Yet, one may wonder why the
Hague Rules ever granted such gross incursions into the principle of
employers' liability. The exceptions seem chiefly to have antiquity
in their favour. They developed when the shipping industry lacked
the means for communication between the shipowner and his ship
when it was at sea. The owner had to rely on the independent
observations and judgment of the master he appointed, and he was
not willing to accept responsibility for an employee whom he could
not supervise or direct. What began as common contractual
95
exceptions, which the courts would enforce, though narrowly,
found their way into the Hague Rules.
If such was the argument, it certainly has no validity today, if
indeed it ever had any. Modern technology permits continuous
93. Tetley, supra, n. 15, p. 172.
94. Leval & Co. Inc. v. ColonialSteamships, Ltd., [1961] 1L I.R 560 (S.C.C.).
95. Carver, supra, n. 13, paras. 172 and 232. Canada does not have a fire statute
equivalent to U.K. Merchant Shipping Act, s. 502.
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ship-to-shore communications so that carriers and, masters may
consult about the transit, except, perhaps, during an emergency,
such as an impending collision. Given these circumstances, there is
no longer sufficient reason to relieve a carrier of his normal
vicarious responsibilities, which both the Hague Rules and the
general law otherwise uphold. In this light, the Hamburg Rules may
be seen to reaffirm the general principle of fault, common to both
sets of rules, by the elimination of the exemptions in the Hague
Rules for employees' negligence in fire and navigation, which
appeared necessary when introduced. The Hamburg Rules readjust
the standard of cargo care in modern conditions to a level originally
intended by the Hague Rules, except insofar as the equipment and
prevailing methods then available seemed to make that level unfair
to carriers.
Liability for breach of the standard of cargo care depends upon
adequate proof. It is usual in law for the claimant to have to prove
his claim before the defendant is called upon to rebut or excuse his
alleged defaults. In cases of carriage under the Hague Rules, the
carriers' responsibilities are so dissected with interdependent
exceptions that the burdens of proof have become quite confused.
Once the cargo owner has shown that his goods were lost in transit,
may the carrier immediately claim an exception, such as perils of
the sea or insufficient packing? Must the carrier first prove he was
diligent in preparing the ship for the voyage and careful in the
carriage, or may he leave their proof to the cargo owner in
rebuttable of his exemption? The courts have still not completely
determined these basic issues, 96 partly because the definitions of
obligation and exception are circular. The seas are only a peril to a
ship when they are unforeseeably fierce, and the owner who
diligently prepares his vessel will make it seaworthy against
foreseeable weather, including the likelihood of typical storms.
Thus, proof of the excepted peril is evidence that unseaworthiness
was not the cause of loss, while proof of seaworthiness suggests the
peril must have been the cause.
Cases are often lost because adequate proof of events cannot be
made. How did a fire start? How did water enter? If the party who
has the burden of proof cannot answer this kind of question, at least
96. Compare, for instance, Maxine Footwear v. CanadianGovernment Merchant
Marine (1959). 21 D.L.R. (2d) I (P.C.) and Gamlen Chemical Co. v. Shipping
Corporationof India Ltd., [1978] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 12 (C.A.). See Carver, supra, n.
13, paras. 511-513.
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through circumstantial evidence, then he will bear the loss. In this
way, the distribution of the burdens of proof may indirectly, but
substantially, affect the commercial risks of carriage. Hence, a fair
distribution of the burden of proof is as important as the
establishment of a reasonable standard of cargo care.
In point of fact, the cargo owner often faces difficulty in
establishing the cause of his loss. The carrier and his employees,
who are not likely to implicate themselves, typically have exclusive
access to the evidence of a mishap in port or at sea. Usually, the
cargo owner is able to establish a prima facie case of liability by
proving that the damage or loss occurred while the carrier had
charge of the cargo. This the cargo owner can do by producing the
bill of lading as proof of the quantity and condition of the goods
when loaded 9 7 and by requesting an independent survey of the cargo
at discharge. 98 The Hague Rules do not expressly set the order of
proof, but the cargo owner's obligation to make a prima facie case
in this way may fairly be read out of their provisions, especially
those relating to bills of lading. 9 9 The uncertainties in the burden of
proof arise thereafter in the degree to which the carrier must
disprove the cargo owner's claim. The Hamburg Rules, by
comparison, are much more straightforward. Their expression of
the standard of cargo care makes clear that the carrier is liable "if
the occurrence which caused the loss, damage or delay took place
while the goods were in his charge . . . unless the carrier proves
that he . ..took all measures that could reasonably be required to
avoid the occurrence and its consequences."' 10 0 Plainly, the cargo
owner must prove the loss or damage that occurs during carriage,

97. Under the Hague Rules Art. 111(4), the bill of lading is only prima facie
evidence of the goods, but under the Hague/Visby Rules Art. 111(4) and the
Canadian Bills of Lading Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-6, s. 4, it becomes conclusive
proof in the hands of the consignee.
98. Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. S-9, s. 609 obliges the port warden,
when requested by carrier, master, or cargo owner, to examine the goods on board,
to ascertain the cause of their damage, and to keep a note of his inquiries. Under s.
611, the carrier is presumed negligent and liable for cargo that is discharged in a
damaged condition when the hatches of the ship have not been first opened by a
port warden. The clear implication is that the master should call for an independent
examination under s. 609 if he has any reason to suspect that the cargo has been
injured during the voyage.
99. Hague Art. 111(3), (4), (5), (7). And see Tetley, supra, n. 15, c. 5.

100. Hamburg Art. 5(1).
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and then the carrier must clear himself of all implication of liability,
if he can. The Hamburg Rules, therefore, sustain the same general
principles regarding order of proof that the Hague Rules imply, but
quickly confuse.
The Hamburg Rules are not entirely without exceptions to the
order of proof, of which the main one concerns fire. Although
carriers have become responsible under the Hamburg Rules for the
negligence of employees in the event of fire, the cargo claimant
must affirmatively prove their default. 1 1 This specific onus is a
serious reversal of the general order of proof that the carrier shall
show that he and his employees were not negligent, because the
cause of a spontaneous fire is often very difficult to establish. Yet,
although the burden of proof on the cargo owner is an exception
under the Hamburg Rules, it is not out of line with practice under
the Hague Rules, where the carrier is exempt.' 0 2 On the whole, the
Hamburg Rules reassert, with clarity, principles of the general law
regarding burdens of proof, which were also known to the Hague
Rules before they were lost in a welter of exceptions to the carrier's
commercial responsibility.
Even when the standard of cargo care has not been met and a case
may be proven against the carrier, the claimant's victory will still be
incomplete because the carrier has a right to limit his liability. This
right is as important as the standard of responsibility or the burdens
of proof. Commercially, it fixes the outcome of the case, which is
all that matters to the disputing businessmen. By inference, it sets
the financial boundaries to the commercial risks of each contracting
party from the beginning of the carriage. Thus, carriers and cargo
owners alike can calculate their costs in advance, set their charges,
and buy insurance for foreseen financial contingencies. This way of
organizing an industry can be successful, providing the limits of
liability are not too low. The legal concern must be that the
limitation on liability does nothing to impair the carrier's principal
obligation to care for the goods. Making the carrier pay for his faults
is the surest way to enforce the legal standard. Although limitation
of liability runs counter to the principle of fault, it will not defeat it

101. Hamburg Art. 5(4).

102. His exemption does not extend to his own faults regarding fire, but the burden
of proof of them is uncertain. See Tetley, supra, n. 15, p. 185.
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as long as the monetary limits are high enough to make it
worthwhile for the carrier to take the necessary precautions for
10 3
cargo care.
The Hague Rules seemed to satisfy these commercial and legal
requirements at their inception. The carrier's liability was originally
limited to £ 100 "per package or unit",10 4 unless the nature and the
value of the goods was declared upon shipment. However, the
rigidity of this limit has run into at least three kinds of problems
over the passage of time. First, exchange rates were never constant
and they fluctuate even more today. Yet the Hague Rules allowed
states to legislate the limit in their own currency.' 0 5 Canada
calculated the equivalence at $500, but this sum is nearer three
times the value of £ 100 today. Second, inflation has dealt rampantly
with the value of goods, while the Hague Rules long remained
unchanged.1 0 6 Third, the itemization of cargo has been altered by
developments in shipping technology in ways that the referents in
the Hague Rules do not accommodate.
The term "unit" has always raised arguments, whether it was
shipping or freight units that were intended. The American
enactment expressly refers to "customary freight units", 0 7 which
is certainly the more rational of the two meanings when calculating
limits of liability for bulk cargoes. But bulk goods are not usually
carried under bills of lading, to which the Hague Rules apply, and
other states, including Canada,' 0 8 have determined that the
unqualified word "unit" should be read ejusdem generis with
"package". The difference lies in whether or not the item of cargo
is enclosed by packing.
Whether they were packages or units, the pieces of cargo were
only so large as could be manhandled. More recently, the
development of mechanical handling methods has permitted the
consolidation of goods on pallets, in containers, and in LASH
barges. Their use has grossly increased the size of the unit moved
103. Lord Diplock, Conventions and Morals Limitation Clauses in International
Maritime Conventions (1969-70) 1 J. Mar. L. & Comm. 525.
104. Hague Art. 1V(5).
105. Hague Art. IX.
106. The Visby Amendments to Hague Art. IV(5) doubled the monetary limit, but
they still afford less recovery at today's values than the Hague Rules did at their
inception.
107. U.S. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1936, 46 U.S.C. 1304(5).
108. FalconbridgeNickel Mines et al v. Chimo Shipping Ltd. et al, [ 1974] S.C.R.
933.

The Hague Rules 615

and has complicated the itemization of the cargo. Attempts by
carriers to limit their liability for a twenty- or forty-foot container to
that for either a package or a unit of carriage have, in general, not
been successful. Indeed, an award of $500 compensation for a
container filled with goods would be derisory. Yet great uncertainty
as to how to count the cargo inside such a container for the purposes
of limited liability has been generated. 109
The Hamburg Rules deal straight forwardly with all of these
problems of limited liability, while maintaining the principle. The
rate of compensation is raised and its mode of calculation is
changed. The Hamburg Rules grant up to "835 units of account per
package or other shipping unit or 2.5 units of account per
kilogramme." 110 The unit of account is the Special Drawing Right
of the International Monetary Fund."1 It was deliberately chosen in
an effort to overcome the divergencies between exchange values of
national currency. Thus, courts, in making awards of damages,
should be able to fix liability limits in local funds that are made
internationally uniform by reference to IMF valuation on the day of
the judgment. 1 2 But, while this system may cope with fluctuations
in exchange rates, it obviously does not deal with inflation in
monetary values of cargoes. Lack of inflation protection is
particularly a weakness of the Hamburg reforms, since the limit of
liability, though higher, is yet not great. The compensation rate of
835 SDRs per package is roughly equal to C$ 1,250,113 or two and a
half times the amount granted by the Hague Rules, as applied in
Canada. The Canadian dollar has devalued considerably more over
the same period of time. Thus, the Hamburg Rules do not afford
even as much compensation to an injured cargo owner as the Hague
Rules did at their adoption. Whether this limit is sufficient to attract
the attention of carriers to provide proper care for cargoes has yet to

109. Consumers Distributing Co. Ltd. v. Dart Containerline etal (1980), 31 N.R.
181 (F.C.A.D.). See Carver. supra, n. 13. paras. 552-559. The functional package
test has now been abandoned. Mitsui & Co. Ltd. and Ataka & Co. Ltd. v. American
Export Lines, Inc., [1981] A.M.C. 331 (2d Cir.).
110. Hamburg Art. 6(l)(a). Cp. Hague/Visby Art. IV(5), as further amended after
the Hamburg Rules by a Protocol of 1979.
Ill. Hamburg Art. 6(3), 26.
112. For states that are not members of the IMF, separate provision is also made
for the translation of Hamburg units of account into their local currencies. Hamburg
Art. 26(2).
113. Assuming I SDR is valued by the IMF at about C$1.50.
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be tested. 114 Other features of the Hamburg regime may be more
encouraging to them.
The introduction of an alternative limitation by weight,
"whichever is the higher",11 5 is advantageous to cargo owners and
especially to owners of heavy goods. In addition, it provides a
convenient resolution to some of the problems of cargo itemization.
For compensatory purposes, bulk goods can easily be accounted
for, and unitized goods can be weighed readily. Description of
cargo items has been further clarified by explicit reference to
shipping, not freight, units, 1 6 and by instructions regarding
containers and pallets. Consolidated goods are to be regarded as
they are enumerated in the carriage documents." 7 Thus, if the
shipper supplies information to the carrier that expresses the
quantity of items or the number of cases of goods in a container, the
limitation of liability for loss will be calculated using those figures
as the number of packages or units. Furthermore, the container
itself, if not the carrier's, is considered a separate shipping unit."18
Failing enumeration of the contents, the container will be treated as
one unit. Thus, the cargo owner has a powerful influence on the
limit of the compensation he may expect, determined by how he
initially describes the goods to be carried. The provision seems to be
an appropriate rule of self-interest.
The Hamburg Rules make two other innovations of less certain
consequence. They concern liability for delay and liability for
wilful default. Consistent with the separation of responsibility for
loss by delay from responsibility for physical loss or damage to the
goods, the Hamburg Rules set particular limits to liability for delay.
That amount is "two and a half times the freight payable for the
goods delayed, but not exceeding the total freight. '" 1 9 Furthermore, the aggregate of liability for lost and delayed goods may not
114. The Hamburg limitation on sea transit is much lower than limits in all other
modes of transport, so much so that it caused difficulties in obtaining an acceptable
liability regime in the Multimodal Convention of 1980. See United Nations
Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods, Art. 18(l)(3). That
convention, incidently, increased the sea-leg limit of liability by ten percent over
the Hamburg Rules to allow for inflation that occurred since 1978, even though
they have never yet been applied. Multimodal Convention Art. 18.
115. Hamburg Art. 6(l)(a).
116. Id.
117. Hamburg Art. 6(2)(a).
118. Hamburg Art. 6(2)(b).
119. Hamburg Art. 6(l)(b).
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exceed the limited amount if all the cargo had been destroyed. 12 It
is not obvious why damages for delay should be related to freight,
rather than to the value of goods as they are with other causes of
loss. Indeed, a claim for delay is typically made because the cargo
owner has suffered an economic loss in the value of his goods. How
this new approach will effect awards for delay is not yet known, but
it has undoubtedly complicated the liability rules. The need to
correlate damages for delay and for loss has been crudely
recognized in the aggregation rule, but so intimate a relationship
might best not have been severed in the first place. 121
The other innovation made by the Hamburg Rules is to permit the
breaking of the limits of liability. That is, the carrier will lose the
right to limit his liability if he acted with intent to cause loss or acted
recklessly in disregard of damage to the goods. 12 2 Neither of these
extremes of conduct are likely, but they just might catch the carrier
who is not mindful of the goods because the limitation amounts do
not make it worth his while to do so. In the result, he will find he is
loaded with unlimited liability. The more obvious issue is whether
this provision ousts the doctrine of fundamental breach. The
doctrine has been used on occasion to impose unlimited liability in
the face of the Hague Rules, even though their provision on limited
liability is expressed to apply "in any event.' 123 The Hamburg
Rules certainly set stiffer criteria for the claimant to meet before the
carrier loses his right to limit liability. In common law jurisdictions,
there would ordinarily be no reason to imply ouster without mention
of fundamental breach, but, in an international convention which
unifies law in numerous jurisdictions, many of which are not
familiar with the doctrine, courts may pause to consider that the
Hamburg Rules grant an absolute right to limit liability, except
under their express exceptions.
Apart from these two uncertain innovations, the Hamburg Rules
have reformed the limits of liability consistently with the original
purposes of the Hague Rules. Far from adding grossly to the
carrier's liability, they have tended to restore, albeit not completely,
the amount of responsibility initially imposed on him by the Hague

120. Hamburg Art. 6(1)(c).
121. Tetley, supra, n. 15, 135.
122. Hamburg Art. 8.
123. For example, Jones v. The Flying Clipper, [1954] A.M.C. 259 (S.D.N.Y.);

Stag Line Ltd. v. Foscolo, Mango and Co., supra, n. 96. See the discussion in
Tetley, supra, n. 15, p. 27.
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Rules. Monetary values that have been eaten away by inflation are
partially replaced by increased limits. Cargo units that have been
increased by mechanical handling techniques may be broken down,
through enumeration, to their actual items. Whether so intended or
not, both changes bear relation to the values and practices current
under the Hague Rules at their inception.
IV. Conclusion
The Hamburg Rules are to replace the Hague Rules. The question
pursued here is whether the Hamburg Rules will regulate
international sea carriage better than the Hague Rules now do. In
light of comparative investigation of the comprehensiveness of the
rules, the clarity of the law, and the fairness of the risks, the answer
is affirmative. The Hamburg Rules extend their scope of application
beyond that of the Hague Rules to include a number of
commercially significant aspects of carriage. In particular, they
make provision for imported, as well as exported, goods and do so
without regard to any special form of carriage document. They
extend to cargoes from port to port and include any intervening
transshipment or transit on deck. In general, the greater
comprehensiveness of the Hamburg Rules presages more success
than the Hague Rules had in achieving an internationally uniform
regime for sea trade.
The makers of the Hamburg Rules made good use of the
opportunity to clarify the obscurities of the Hague Rules. The
Hamburg Convention obviates the significance of the references to
bills of lading, deck carriage, and carrier identity, and provides a
new formula with which to count cargo units. The Hamburg Rules
may be less successful in dealing with contractors, employed
independently by the carrier, who handle the goods on the
waterfront. Until the courts express themselves on the issue, there
must also be doubts about the ultimate scope of both the period and
the standard of the carrier's responsibility. As yet, it is difficult to
foretell whether the benefits of clarifying the obscurities under the
Hague Rules will outweigh the disadvantages introduced by the
uncertainties of the Hamburg Rules.
The distribution of the commercial risks in sea carriage is
adjusted considerably by the Hamburg Rules, and is notably
consistent with the objectives of the Hague Rules. In the substantial
matters of responsibility for cargo, proof of fault, and limitation of
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liability, the Hamburg Rules make provisions that are congruent
with the standards adopted by the Hague Rules. The changes
contained in the provisions reflect the technological developments
that have taken place in the shipping industry during the intervening
years. In large measure, the Hamburg Rules correct the balance of
risks, which, on the whole, has moved over time to favour carriers,
and reset it under modern conditions toward the equilibrium
originally struck by the Hague Rules. In addition, the Hamburg
Rules include procedural amendments for claims and actions, which
experience under the Hague Rules rendered necessary. Overall, the
Hamburg Rules seem to offer more of a chance for international
uniformity of law in the carriage of goods by sea, and constitute a
regime that is as fair to carriers and cargo owners as the Hague
Rules ever were.

